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RECOVERED MEMORIES OF
CHILDHOOD ABUSE: SHOULD
LONG-BURIED MEMORIES BE
ADMISSIBLE TESTIMONY?
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 30, 1990, George Franklin, Jr. was convicted of
first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison.' The 1969 murder
of eight-year-old Susan Nason had gone unsolved until Franklin's
daughter, Eileen Franklin Lipsker ("Eileen"), reported what she called
a recovered memory of witnessing her father murder her best friend
Susan.2 Eileen, then age twenty-nine, testified that she was watching
her five-year-old daughter, who bore a striking resemblance to Susan
Nason, when suddenly an image of Susan looking at her while Franklin
raised a rock over Susan's head flashed through Eileen's mind. 5 Ten
months after she recovered this memory, Eileen contacted the police. 4
When George Franklin's case came to trial, Eileen's recovered
memory provided the only evidence linking him to the murder of
Susan Nason.5 Eileen testified extensively about what she remembered
and how she had come to remember it. 6 The prosecution called Dr.
Lenore Terr ("Terr"), a psychiatry professor and clinician from San
Francisco and a specialist in childhood trauma, as an expert witness to
support Eileen's testimony.'' Terr testified to the phenomenon of re-
Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 Am. Psycmoi.. 518, 518 (1993).
2 Victor Barall, Thanks for the Memories: Criminal Law and the Psychology of Memory, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 1473, 1477 (1994) (reviewing HARRY N. MACLEAN, ONCE UPON A TIME: A TRUE
STORY OF MEMORY, MURDER, AND 'rum LAW (1993)).
3 ELIZABETH F. Lorrus & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY 40, 70
(1994).
See Loftus, supra note I, at 518-19. Eileen's memory underwent several important trans-
formations between the time she first told her story to police and the trial. Baran, supra note 2,
at 1489-90. For example, she initially said that her father had picked up Susan in his van in the
morning before school and taken her and Eileen to the spot where Susan was killed. Id. In fact,
Susan was last seen after school. Id. Eileen subsequently told police that as she searched her
memory, she realized that the angle of the sun in that scene made it impossible for the murder
to have happened in the morning, so her father must have picked up Susan after school. Lorrus
& KETCHAM, supra note 3, in 46.
5 Loftus, supra note 1, at 579.
6 Barall, supra note 2, at 1487-88.
Id. at 1490.
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pressed and recovered memory.8 She told the jury that whole memo-
ries can be preserved intact for a prolonged period of time and later
recovered, often triggered by a visual cue such as Eileen's glimpse of
her daughter's face in a particular expression that reminded her of
Susan's expression just before she was killed. 9 The defense called Dr.
David Spiegel ("Spiegel"), a psychiatry professor with credentials as
impressive as Terr's, to challenge Terr's theory of repression and re-
covery.'° Spiegel described to the jury the difficulty in distinguishing
between a false memory and a true one and testified that as memories
age they are increasingly likely to mix fact and fantasy." He further
testified that many of the aspects of Eileen's childhood, including
possible abuse by her father, could explain why her unconscious mind
might create an image of her father killing her friend. 12 No physical
evidence remained connecting Franklin to the murder, and no addi-
tional witnesses testified to seeing him anywhere near Susan Nason or
the murder site that day.'s The jury had little more than Eileen's
testimony and the testimony of the expert witnesses as evidence of
Franklin's guilt.' 4 When the trial was completed, it took the jury only
a day to return a first- degree murder conviction. 15
In 1993, a Massachusetts jury awarded a $500,000 verdict against
a civil defendant for sexual abuse inflicted on his daughter, Jennifer
Hoult. 16 Jennifer alleged that her father had raped her approximately
3000 times when she was between the ages of four and sixteen.' 7 She
had no recollection of these events, she said, until she entered therapy
in October 1985.' 8 Her mother, who was divorced from her father,
testified that she had never witnessed any of these alleged incidents,
8 See id. at 1490-91.
Id. at 1491.
19 Barall, supra note 2, at 1492.
11 Id.
12 Id.
15 See Loftus, supra note I, at 519.
14 See id.
15 Id. at 518. A federal district court judge recently overturned Franklin's conviction and
ordered a new trial. Franklin v. Duncan, No. G94-1430 DLJ (N.D. Cal. 1995). The issue of the
validity of Eileen's recovered memory was not at issue in the appeal. Id. The court rested its
decision on two issues that, it held, resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial: an instruction to the
jury that they could consider Franklin's silence when asked by his daughter if he committed the
crime, and the trial judge's refusal to allow into evidence newspaper articles from the period
following Susan Nason's death that would have shown how Eileen could have known the details
that she reported without having witnessed the murder. Id,
16 Matthew Brelis, Man Must Pay $500,000 for Raping His Daughter, BosTolv GI.013E, July 2,
1995, at 1.
17 Id
18 1d.
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but she had seen Jennifer's father grab a baby-sitter's breast once. 19
Jennifer's three siblings have no memory of any abuse, either of them-
selves or of their sister." In addition to Jennifer's and her mother's
testimony, an expert witness testified that she had evaluated Jennifer
and that her symptoms were consistent with her allegations. 21 It took
the jury only four hours to return a verdict for Jennifer Houk."
In 1991, an Iowa man, baffled by his daughter's accusations of
sexual abuse, hired a female private investigator to find out what
his daughter had been exposed to during therapy." The investigator,
Sharon, made an appointment with the daughter's therapist, Kate. 24
Sharon reported sleep disturbances, depression, some minor problems
with alcohol and a tense relationship with her mother and stepfather."
Kate told her that her sleep disturbances were a form of body memory
that often reflected a memory of "a particularly dreadful period of
time" in a person's life." Sharon asked how one might find out if
something bad had happened, to which the therapist responded, "The
hyper-startle response itself is a suggestion that something did hap-
pen," and suggested that, once Sharon trusted her, she allow the
therapist to take her back in time. 27
At another session, Sharon appeared upset and reported having
had a terrible week, with nightmares, waking up with pain and waking
up feeling that someone was in the room." At this point the therapist
told Sharon that she was almost certainly experiencing body memory
from a trauma earlier in life that she could not remember because her
brain had blocked the memory." Kate then began to read from a
self-help book a list of forty symptoms associated with sexual abuse. 3°
As she read two-thirds of the symptoms, she looked at Sharon and
12 Id. at 1,13.
2° See id. at 13.
21 Brelis, supra note 16, at 13. The verdict was upheld by the linked States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit in May 1995. Houk v. Hoult, 57 F.3d I, 5 (1st Cir. 1995).
22 Id.
22 Los-rus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 176-77.
24 Id. at 191-92.
22 Id. at 191.
26 Id. at 192-93.
27 Id. at 193.
22 Lorrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 199. The second session was largely uneventful. Id.
Kate focused on Sharon's drinking and recommended weekly Alcoholics Anonymous meet-
ings. Id.
29 Id. She also told Sharon that she wanted to lend her the book The Courage to Heal, a
self-help hook that is touted as the bible of the incest-recovery movement. Id. at 195.
30 Id. at 195.
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nodded her head in confirmation. 3 ' She recommended three incest
survivor meetings for Sharon to attend before the next session."
At the fourth and final session, Sharon again questioned the
diagnosis, saying she had no memory of any abuse. 33 The therapist told
her that it appeared that Sharon had experienced some trauma and
that most of the time people with her symptoms had experienced some
kind of abuse. 34
 She qualified this by saying, "It's not for me to say I
know," but continued, "It appears that something is coming to the
surface. "35 They proceeded to discuss the process of recovering mem-
ory, and the therapist told Sharon that memories might come back in
little pieces, all at once, or might never come back as visual memories.36
She told Sharon, "You can't shut the memories but. They need to
come. "37
These stories represent some of the essential ingredients of the
recovered memory debate and some of the implications of this contro-
versy for the legal profession." The experience of the investigator
reflects the concern of some professionals that recovered memories
are distorted and perhaps even created by highly suggestive therapeu-
tic techniques." The verdict in favor of Jennifer Hoult raises a concern
for many that a memory recovered in therapy can become powerful
enough, to the person who recovers the memory and to those who
hear her story, to eclipse a complete lack of corroborating evidence. 40
Finally, the outcome of the Franklin case, to the extent that it turned
on expert testimony, and the jury's belief in Eileen's memory, repre-
sents to some the dangers and uncertainties involved in bringing a
recovered memory into a courtroom. 4 '
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Lorrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 195.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 196.
w Id. at 196-97.
37 Id. at 197.
38 See Lorrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 177; Barall, supra note 2, at 1486; Gary M.
Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution About Tolling the
Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84J. GRIM. LAW 129,158,162-63 (1993).
" See Lorrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 177; Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 158-60.
The investigator visited the therapist at the request of an accused parent, which may lead some
to question whether her report is an independent, objective representation of what occurs in
therapy. See LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 177-78. Nonetheless, most of the sessions were
taped, and the tapes and her notes are an interesting glimpse into how a therapist might suggest
a memory of sexual abuse on the basis of some very general symptoms, even if one is skeptical
of the report, See id.
40 See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 162-63.
41 See Barall, supra note 2, at 1486.
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In the past, a person who recovered a memory of childhood sexual
abuse after many years would have no legal recourse because both civil
and criminal statutes of limitations would have expired long before the
recovery of the memory."' In recent years, however, this has changed.43
Many states have recognized both the equitable problem of barring
plaintiffs from suit when they had no memory for many years of the
act that gave rise to the suit and the simple injustice of allowing
perpetrators of child abuse to go unpunished." Most states that have
addressed this issue have applied the discovery rule to their statutes of
limitations, either through case law or through legislative action, allow-
ing the statutes to toll not when the act occurred but when the plaintiff
discovered the act and the resulting harm. 45 As a result, an increasing
number of cases involving recovered memories of sexual abuse are
presenting courts with new and difficult evidentiary issues.'"
One particularly vexing issue that has not been resolved, and as
yet has been largely unaddressed, is the question of a witness's compe-
tence to testify to long-buried, recently recovered memories. 47 The
potential dangers of such testimony are analogous to the dangers of
hypnotically refreshed testimony that have been addressed by most
courts.'" Courts have recognized three primary dangers associated with
hypnosis: the danger of suggestibility; the possibility that the subject
will "confabulate," or fill in the gaps of his or her story, in order to
present a more coherent picture of an event; and the danger that the
42 See Jacqueline Kanovitz, Hypnotic Memories and Civil Sexual Abuse Trials, 45 VAND. L. REv.
1185, 1200-03 (1992) (describing the difficulties raised by short statutes of limitations for abuse
survivors and the recent changes in those laws).
43 1d. at 1200.
44 See, e.g., Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 234-35 (Wash. 1986) (Pearson, J., dissenting) (the
Tyson decision, in which the majority declined to extend the statute of limitations, was overturned
by a subsequent state statute extending the limitations period); Mary D. v. John El., 264 Cal. Rptr.
633, 638-39 (Ct. App. 1989) (balancing "the plaintiff's right to seek redress for an outrageous
violation against her which she has ... repressed until recently, through no fault of her own and
as a direct result of the . . . abuse" against the right of a defendant to be free from stale claims,
and applying the delayed discovery rule to cases of repressed memory).
45 See, e.g.,Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (N.D. III. 1988) (applying Illinois law
and holding that the statute of limitations should be tolled for plaintiffs who repressed memories
of sexual abuse); Mary D., 264 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (applying discovery rule to plaintiff who can show
that memory of abuse was repressed).
48 See. Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 162; Walter Reich, The Monster in the Mists, N.Y.
TIMES Boost REVIEW, at 1, 33 (reviewing LAwitENcE WRIGHT, REMEMBERING SATAN (1994),
MICHAEL YAM°, SUGGESTIONS OF ABUSE: TRUE AND FALSE MEMORIES OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL
TRAUMA (1994), and LENORE TERR, UNCHAINED MEMORIES: TRUE STORIES OF TRAUMATIC MEMO-
RIES, LOST AND FOUND (1994)); When Memories Collide: Therapists Draw Fire from Those. Who Say
They Mix Fact and Fantasy, NEwsnAv, Dec. 13, 1994, at 833.
47 See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 166.
48 See id. at 162; Barall, supra note 2, at 1486 n.47.
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subject will experience an increased, often unjustified, confidence in
the truth of his or her story. 49
 This "memory hardening" has been cited
as an important consideration because it renders effective cross-exami-
nation difficult if not impossible."
Similar dangers might be attributed to the process of recovering
a long-buried memory of sexual abuse through therapy. 5 ' The thera-
peutic process that evokes these memories poses a danger of suggesti-
bility.52
 Further, a perceived message from the therapist that sexual
abuse is an acceptable, even encouraged, explanation for the patient's
problems, may raise a danger of confabulation by the patient similar
to that found in hypnosis." Finally, the circumstances surrounding the
memory recovery may raise a danger that a patient, after prolonged
therapy and effective isolation from family members who might chal-
lenge her story, will experience an increased confidence in the mem-
ory, even if the memory is not true. 54
Thus far, the competence of witnesses to testify to recently recov-
ered memories has not been directly challenged, except to the extent
that those memories were recovered through hypnosis." If confronted
with such a challenge, courts may find guidance in the treatment of
hypnotically refreshed testimony over the past decade." Part II of this
Note will examine the controversy over repressed memory and some
of the problems presented by the testimony of recovered memory
49 See, e.g., Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 131-32 (Alaska 1986); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d
764, 768-69 (Minn. 1980); State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 93 (NJ. 1981).
50 See Contreras, 718 P.2d at 133; Math, 292 N.W,2d at 769; Hurd, 432 A.2d at 93-94.
51
 See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 162.
52 See id. at 158.
53 See id. at 159-60.
54 Id. at 162-63; see Frontline: Divided Memories (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 11, 1995)
(discussing treatment center that advocates "detachment" of clients from families of origin as a
necessary component of therapy).
55 See, e.g., Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1505 (D. Conn. 1994), affd, 68 F.3d 597 (2d
Cir. 1995) (holding that testimony refreshed by therapeutic hypnosis must be evaluated by looking
at the hypnotist's qualifications, whether the hypnotist added new elements to the subject's
description, the existence of a permanent record of the hypnosis and the existence of corrobo-
rating evidence); McGlauflin v. State, 857 P.2d 366, 378 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
testimony refreshed during therapeutic hypnosis is admissible if the circumstances of the hypnosis
make it likely that the witness's memory has not been enhanced or altered by the hypnosis); State
v. Varela, 817 P.2d 731, 732 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that testimony refreshed by therapeutic
hypnosis is admissible only if the trial court determines under all the circumstances that the use
of hypnosis was reasonably likely to result in recall comparable to normal human memory); West
v. Howard, 601 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ohio Ci App. 1991) (holding that a particular therapeutic
hypnosis procedure did not meet the procedural safeguards used in Ohio to evaluate reliability
and that the witness should not be allowed to testify); Jo Becker, "Recovered Memories" on Trial
in N.H. Rape Cases, PATRIOT LEDGER, Dec. 24, 1994, at 17.
56 See Baran, supra note 2, at 1486 n.47; Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 162, 165.
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witnesses." Part III will examine the recent treatment of hypnotically
refreshed testimony and the reasoning behind the restrictions placed
on such testimony. 58 Finally, Part IV will explore the extent to which
recovered memory testimony resembles hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony and the extent to which the restrictions imposed on previously
hypnotized witnesses are applicable to recovered memory witnesses."
II. THE RECOVERED MEMORY CONTROVERSY
Those who claim to have recovered memories of childhood abuse
may have accessed those memories in a number of different ways.
Some, like Eileen Franklin, assert that the memories returned spon-
taneously, triggered by a perceptual cue." Others report that their
memories surfaced during therapy. The range of therapeutic environ-
ments in which these memories may surface is extensive. On one
extreme, a therapist might play a relatively passive role, following the
Freudian model of listening with "evenly hovering attention" as the
patient free associate Eventually, a narrative of what the patient has
experienced in his or her life emerges from this process of free asso-
ciation, which might include an uncovered memory of a childhood
trauma."
On the other extreme, some therapies involve aggressive attempts
to unlock hidden memories." Therapists who specialize in incest re-
covery and authors of self-help books suggest several specific tech-
niques for memory retrieval." Many therapists recommend asking the
patients directly if they have been sexually abused, reasoning that the
question will at least signal to the patients that they will be believed if
they disclose abuse." The second recommendation is the use of "symp-
57 See infra notes 60-242 and accompanying text.
58 See infra notes 243-374 and accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 375-473 and accompanying text. This Note will focus on memories recov-
ered through the process of therapy and will not address the issues raised by memories recovered
spontaneously, without any therapeutic intervention.
55 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. Eileen had actually originally told her brother
that she recovered this memory under hypnosis, but later claimed to have said that only because
she wanted him to believe her. MACLEAN, supra note 2, at 352,
61 See DONALD P. SPENCE, NARRATIVE TRUTH AND HISTORICAL. TRUTH; MEANING AND INTER-
PRETATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 24-25, 28-29 (1982) (describing Freud's model but suggesting
that the analyst must in reality take a slightly more active posture in order to provide context for
what the patient is saying).
"2 See id. at 28.
65 Lorrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 141.
" Id. at 151-70.
"5 Id. at 151.
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tom lists," reading through with the patient a list of behaviors and
emotions that might indicate a history of sexual abuse 66 Another
technique relies on imagistic work, asking the patient to start with an
image as a focal point and to describe every sight and sensation that
he or she experiences in response to that image.° A similar technique
is journal writing, in which patients are asked to perform the same
exercise in writing. 6B Another related technique, art therapy, substitutes
drawing for writing or verbal expression in reporting the thoughts or
feelings evoked by a particular huage. 69 In all three of these exercises,
therapists may encourage their patients to free associate or to "tell a
story" about what might have happened, as a way to further remove
their conscious barriers against remembering. 70
Some therapists also employ dream work, in which patients are
asked to keep a record of symbols and images from their dreams that
might be memory fragments. 71 Another technique, body work, involves
attempts to access physical reactions to certain stimuli, through meth-
ods like massage therapy. 72 Therapists may also employ feelings work,
which involves a patient working with either grief or rage, expressing
the feeling nonverbally and allowing it to escalate until the patient
achieves some form of release.73 Some therapists believe that this re-
lease of pent-up emotions can help unblock a patient's memory. 74 In
addition to whatever work is done individually between therapist and
patient, many therapists encourage their patients to undergo group
therapy with others who are in a similar situation. 76 Finally, some
therapies that focus on the retrieval of long-buried memories involve
the use of hypnosis.76 Hypnosis has been used for many years in the
medical community as a method of helping patients deal with pain,
break addictions or address weight problems." Many believe that hyp-
nosis also can be a powerful tool for unlocking hidden memories. 78
66 Id. at 152-53.
67 1d. at 156.
68 Los-rus 8c KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 160.
69 Id. at 166-67.
70 Id. at 160-61.
71 Id. at 158.
72 Id. at 162.
Lovrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 167.
19 1d. at 168,
75 1d. at 169.
76 Id, at 162.
77 Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1210-11 & n,101.
76 Id. at 1212. Because most courts have addressed the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony, this Note will assume that memories recovered through therapeutic hypnosis are
inadmissible or conditionally admissible as discussed infra notes 335-74 and accompanying text.
May 19961
	
RECOVERED MEMORY	 599
The psychological community is divided over the question of
whether a person can in fact repress all memory of a traumatic child-
hood event and retrieve that memory later in life. 19 The broad range
of circumstances under which these memories are retrieved raises
additional questions about whether some recovered memories are
more or less likely to be accurate than others."
A. The Case for Recovered Memory
Those who believe in the validity of recovered memories assert
that repression operates as a defense mechanism, blocking out con-
scious memories of a terrifying or traumatic event." Some kinds of
events, they argue, are so horrible that a child's mind simply cannot
acknowledge them." Sexual abuse by a parent or a caretaker, they
argue, is one of these events." Not only is the abuse itself terrifying,
but also it creates an irreconcilable conflict in the child's mind be-
tween seeing the abuser as a trusted caretaker and as a person who
frightens and hurts them." Thus, the child may repress the memory
of the incident that created this loyalty conflict because his or her mind
cannot handle the conflicting information'"
Proponents of this theory claim that victims can access these
memories later in life, when they are in a safe and trusting environ-
ment." They claim, however, that the repression is not complete. 87
Although the individual may have successfully blocked conscious mem-
ory of the trauma, emotional problems arising from that trauma can
continue." Thus, they argue, a person who has repressed a memory of
abuse may still exhibit symptoms of abuse." Many of the patients who
later claim to have recovered memories enter therapy initially for
But see Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1260-62 (arguing that the rules of evidence about forensic
hypnosis should not apply to therapeutic hypnosis).
79 See infra notes 210-26 and accompanying text for discussion of division within the psy-
chological community.
80 See infra notes 157-70 for discussion of the level of suggestiveness in different therapeutic
techniques.
81 Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1204; see LENORE TERR, UNCHAINED MEMORIES: TRUE STORIES
01, TRAUMATIC MEMORIES LOST AND FOUND 6-7 (1994).
82 Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1203.
"Id. at 1199.
TERR, supra note 81, at 15; see a/so Josephine A. Bulkley & Mark J. Horowitz, Adults Sexually
Abused as Children: Legal Actions and Issues, 12 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 65,66-67 (1994).
85 See TERR, supra note 81, at 15; Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1199,
88 7tRa, supra note 81, at 12; Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 138.
87 Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1205; see Barall, supra note 2, at 1491-92.
88 Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1205.
89 Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 137; Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1205,
600	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 37:591
problems like eating disorders, substance abuse or depression." For
the therapists who treat them, the intensity of their emotional suffering
before and after any memories are recovered make their claims of
abuse credible.`"
Dr. Lenore Terr, a practicing psychologist in San Francisco and a
frequent expert witness in repressed memory cases, classifies child-
hood trauma into two categories. 92
 Type I trauma involves a single
incident." This type of trauma is likely to be remembered clearly by
the child without any memory repression." Type II trauma involves
ongoing experiences, such as repeated abuse." This trauma, she ar-
gues, is most likely to be repressed.96 In her view, whole memories are
repressed intact and can be recovered years later in much the same
form. 97
 According to Dr. Terr, the return of repressed memories can
be "triggered" by visual cues or exposure to information about some-
one else's similar situation."
In terms of the accuracy of retrieved memories, Dr. Terr suggests
three factors that can indicate whether a recovered memory is true or
false." These factors are the patient's symptoms, the level of detail of
the memory, and the level of emotion accompanying the report of the
memory.'"A patient with symptoms of emotional disturbance, a highly
detailed memory, and a high degree of emotional affect during the
telling is likely to be recovering a memory of a true historical fact.'°'
Proponents of recovered memory look to a number of areas for
support.' 92
 First, the concept of repression as the mind's mechanism
for avoiding conscious confrontation with unacceptable ideas has been
Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 137; Baran, supra note 2, at 1491-92.
91 Lovrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 209 (citing a conversation with Ellen Bass, co-author
of the book The Courage to Heal "Survivors are in so much pain ... why would anyone invent a
story that involved so much anguish and suffering?").
92 ThaR, supra note 81, at 11; Barall, supra note 2, at 1490.
TERR, supra note 81, at 11.
94 Id. at 11,27.
95 1d. at 11.
96 Id. at 12.
97 See id. at 40; Barall, supra note 2, at 1491.
98 See TERR, supra note 81, at 12-13; Barall, supra note 2, at 1491.
99 Barall, supra note 2, at 1491.
ion Id.
101 Id. at 1491-92.
1 °2 See, e.g., Lovrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 215; Jonathan W. Schooler, Seeking the Core:
The Issues & Evidence Surrounding Recovered Accounts of Sexual Thauma, 1994 CONSCIOUSNESS
AND COGNITION 452; Baran, supra note 2, at 1476; Minouche Kandel & Eric Kandel, Flights of
Memory; Biology of Recovered Memory, DISCOVER, May 1994, at 32; Nancy Wartick, A Question of
Abuse: Adults Who Suddenly Remember They Were Victims of Child Abuse, Ass. HEALTH, May 1993,
at 62.
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part of psychiatric parlance since Freud.'" Freud believed that repres-
sion operated as a defense against intolerable thoughts, ideas or memo-
ries. 104 This is often referred to as "motivated forgetting," although in
fact, according to psychoanalytic theory, the content is not forgotten
but remains unconscious and active.m In other words, the content of
what is repressed continues to influence the patient's behavior, atti-
tudes and feelings even though it is not apparent on a conscious
level.'" Freud initially believed that what was repressed in his patients
were actual memories of childhood trauma, specifically seduction by
their fathers. 1 °" Ultimately, he concluded that his patients had instead
repressed wishes and fantasies about their fathers that were unaccept-
able to their conscious minds.'" His theories did, however, embrace
the concept of repression.'" Although experts disagree about the con-
tent of what is repressed and whether it involves actual experience or
fantasy, modern psychoanalytic theory continues to accept this idea of
repression as a defense mechanism. 11 °
Second, proponents of recovered memory point to psychogenic
amnesia as evidence of the phenomenon of forgetting in response to
an emotional stimulus." Psychogenic amnesia, unlike amnesias that
result from a physical injury to the brain, is a loss of memory in
response to a terrifying or traumatic event. 112 Such an event can disrupt
the normal biological process of memory retention and storage." 3 A
victim of such an experience can lose large pieces of memory, often
forgetting personal information such as name and address in addition
to the details of the event.' Thus, according to proponents, recog-
nized phenomena suggest that the human brain has a mechanism to
1 °5 Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 133-34 & n.16; Barall, supra note 2, at 1476-77.
1 °4 Barall, supra note 2, at 1476-77.
I°5 Howard Shevrin, Subliminal Perception and Repression, in REPRESSION AND DISSOCIATION
103,103 (Jerome L. Singer ed., 1990).
1 °6 1d.
1 " JEFFREY M. MASSON, THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH; FREUD'S SUPPRESSION 01"111E SEDUCTION
THEORY 122 (1984); Barall, supra note 2, at 1477-78.
1 °8 MASSON, supra note 107, at 122; Rural!, supra note 2, at 1478.
1 °8 See Sarah], supra note 2, at 1478.
11 ° Id. at 1477.
111 See LOFTUS & KEIT:HAM, supra note 3, at 215.
112 m.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 216. Skeptics point out that psychogenic amnesia is not identical to repression:
importantly, much information is lost that is not related to the trauma, the victims typically recover
their memory within a short period of time, and the victims are usually conscious of having lost
memory. Id. at 215-16.
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repress events and feelings that are too painful to be consciously
tolerated."5
Third, a phenomenon similar to repression has been recognized
in combat veterans suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder." 8
Scientists who have studied combat veterans have found that veterans
who have experienced trauma frequently have no memory of entire
days until fifteen to twenty years later.'" Proponents of repressed mem-
ory point to this phenomenon as proof that the mind is capable of
both repressing and later retrieving intolerable memories."8
Fourth, what scientists know about the biology of memory sup-
ports the proposition that the emotional reaction to trauma can be
stored over time in the brain even if conscious awareness of the his-
torical fact has been repressed.' 19 Researchers believe that "explicit" or
conscious memories are controlled by the temporal lobes and hippo-
campus within the brain, while "implicit" or unconscious memories are
controlled by the automatic nervous system and the amygdala and
cerebellum,'" These two systems both come into play and communi-
cate with each other when a new experience confronts the brain."'
Biologists believe that, in an emotionally charged experience, the con-
scious memory may be stored in one part of the brain and the emo-
tional content may be stored in another.' 22 Thus, the emotional after-
math of a traumatic experience may continue to affect the individual
even if conscious memory of the event has been suppressed or lost,
because it is stored in and controlled by an entirely different part of
the brain."'
Fifth, a number of studies indicate that the initial repression of
intolerable memories is possible and even common.' 24 A recent study
of 129 women who had been treated as children for sexual abuse
revealed that thirty-eight percent claimed no memory of the abuse,
and a number of those who did remember the abuse reported having
forgotten for a period of time. 12" A significant portion of the sample
115 See id.
is w„tick, supra note 102, at 62.
117 /d.
118 See id.
11 See Kandel & Kandel, supra note 102, at 32.
122
 Id. at 36.
121 Id. at 37.
122 Id.
'" See id. at 38.
124 See Schooley, supra note 102, at 459 (discussing various studies of women who claim to
have been sexually abused and women who are known to have been sexually abused).
125 1d. at 458; Alison Bass, Study Finds Traumatic Memories Can Be Recovered, BosToN GLOBE,
Jan. 26, 1995, at 1.
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reported some degree of repression of an event that was known to have
happened to them. 126 Thus, proponents argue, the human mind com-
monly uses repression as a defense against childhood trauma."' An
earlier study of fifty-three patients in treatment for sexual abuse re-
vealed that sixty-four percent had experienced some memory loss
about their abuse, and seventy-four percent claimed to have corrobo-
rating evidence of the abuse. 128 The similarities between what those
who did recover memories remembered and what was known to have
happened to them suggests that recovered memories can correspond
to actual sexual abuse."9
Finally, proponents of recovered memory point to the very exist-
ence of a large number of patients who report these recovered memo-
ries as validation of the theory.'" The stories the patients tell, they
argue, are too vivid and too painful to be the product of imagination or
fabrication.''' The emotional troubles these patients have as adults are
consistent with the kind of abuse that they remember, and would not
be so consistent and so intense in response to a fabricated memory.'"
B. The Case Against Recovered Memory
Those who doubt the validity of recovered memories question the
ability of the mind to store information over a prolonged period of
time and retrieve it accurately." After a period of years, or even
decades, has passed, they argue, there is no way to distinguish a mem-
ory of a true historical fact from other things observed over time or
the mind's own internal information (i.e., dreams, fantasies, wishes).'
Furthermore, they argue, the highly directed and suggestive process
by which many of these memories are retrieved casts further doubt on
the premise that what is recovered is an independent memory of a true
historical fact.' The emotional problems that are identified by clini-
cians as symptoms of sexual abuse are very broad and might encompass
126 See Schooler, supra note 102, at 458-59.
127 See id. at 459.
128 Id. at 456.
1291d.
130 See Lorrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 209.
131 Id.
132 See TERR, supra note 81, at 161, 172.
133 See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 157, 158; When Memories Collide, supra note 46,
at B33.
134 Lorrus & KETCHAM, MOM note 3, at 175; Schooler, supra note 102, at 463; When Memories
Collide, supra note 46, at B33.
135 Lorrus & irxrcimm, supra note 3, at 152, 158, 161, 170 (discussing therapeutic techniques
and the dangers of suggestion involved in each one); Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 158-59.
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any number of problems wholly unrelated to sexual abuse:" A thera-
pist, therefore, in pursuing the question of sexual abuse with a patient,
may simply be offering an understandable explanation for the patient's
emotional problems. 197
 The patient, according to the skeptics, may
latch onto this explanation not because it is true, but because it is an
answer. 138
Repressed memories, according to the skeptics, may represent
something—a fantasy, a dream, an internalization of something seen or
heard—but they cannot be relied on as a representation of the truth.'"
Janice Haaken, a psychologist at Portland State University in Oregon,
suggests that these memories should be seen as an emotional meta-
phor, rather than the literal truth. 14° A memory of sexual abuse, says
Haaken, weaves together many elements of childhood that do not
necessarily involve sexual abuse—ideas of parental power, authority
and domination) ." Thus, emotional problems arising from childhood
conflicts that involve these kinds of issues, but no actual abuse, can
very closely resemble emotional problems arising from sexual abuse: 42
Those who doubt the validity of recovered memory find support
in scientific knowledge about normal (non-repressed) memory, in
studies concerning the possibility of implanting entirely false memo-
ries, in some of the information about the biology of memory, in
evidence of highly suggestive techniques used by some therapists and,
finally, in certain recovered memories that simply stretch credulity too
far. 14" First, skeptics argue, information about normal memory casts
serious doubt on the reliability of the contents of a recovered mem-
ory.' 44
 This information appears both to directly contradict the notion
that the mind stores memory intact until it emerges into consciousness
and to suggest that the influences to which a memory is subject at all
stages are overwhelming:45
136 Lorrus & KETCIIAM, supra note 3, at 154-55.
137 See Loftus, supra note I, at 525.
I314 See id.
139 See Tom McNamee, When Memory Lies; Bernardin Case Heightens Debate Over Repression,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar, 6, 1994, at 1.
140 Id.
" I Id.; see also Loftus, supra note 1, at 525.
142 See McNamee, supra note 139, at 1.
143 See, e.g., Lorrus & KrrctiAnt, supra note 3, at 99, 141; Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38,
at 155; Kandel & Kandel, supra note 102, at 38; Leon Jarolf, Lies of the Mind, TIME, Nov. '29, 1993,
at 52, 59.
144 Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 155.
145 See id.
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Memory researchers assert that "normal" memories are subject to
influences at their three basic stages: perception, retention and re-
trieval.'" At the perception stage, factors including the time of expo-
sure, familiarity with the subject matter of the event, and the stressful-
ness of the incident remembered can influence the accuracy of the
memory.'47 Thus, research on memory suggests that, as the memory
enters the mind, even before it has been stored, external factors can
undermine its accuracy.'"
During the retention stage, the storage of the memory between
its occurrence and its resurfacing in the conscious mind, the memory
is also influenced by external information.'" Studies of normal mem-
ory have shown that it is relatively easy to induce inaccurate memories
by exposure to new facts before reporting.'" This exposure may be
direct, by deliberately telling the subject something about the event
that he or she is supposed to remember, or more subtle, by casual
exposure to other people's conversations or news reports.' 5 ' These
studies involved normal memory, and thus did not test the effects of
such external information on a memory over the long periods of time
associated with repressed memories.'" Skeptics argue that a repressed
memory is especially prone to influence from external factors because
it is often decades old by the time it surfaces and because it is not
consciously rehearsed in the way that non-repressed memories usually
are. 153 Thus, prolonged exposure to external information may have an
even greater influence on the content of the repressed memory as it
ultimately resurfaces than the effect on relatively short-term, non-re-
pressed memories.'"
Finally, memory research suggests that normal memories are influ-
enced at the retrieval stage by the environment in which they are
retrieved, subtle expectations created in the subject's mind, the re-
trieval techniques used and the individuals present.'" Skeptics argue
148 Id.
147 Id. at 156.
148 See id.
148 Ernsdorff' & Loftus, supra note 38, at 156.
16° Id. Numerous studies have revealed what is known as the "Misinformation Effect": the
change in reporting arising from post-event misinformation fed to a subject. Id. at 156 & n.139.
181 Telephone Interview with Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, Professor of Psychology, Adjunct Professor
of Law, University of Washington (Mar. 26, 1995); see Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 156-57
& n,142,
152 See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 157.
153 Id.
154 See id.
1557d. at 158.
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that the circumstances frequently surrounding the retrieval of alleg-
edly repressed memories invite inaccuracies.'" They point to the tech-
niques espoused by therapists and writers in the incest-recovery move-
ment as evidence of the highly suggestive nature of the process by
which victims recover memories. 167
 The direct question about sexual
abuse is employed in order to signal to the client that she will be
believed if she discloses abuse.' 68
 This question, some argue, might
have the additional effect of creating an expectation in the patient's
mind that she will, or should, recover memories of sexual abuse.'" The
use of "symptom lists" with patients may also create a danger of sug-
gestion.'" Loftus warns that many of these symptoms might be per-
fectly harmless (e.g., wearing baggy clothes) unless read in the context
of other symptoms that more directly suggest sexual abuse (e.g., hy-
persexuality as a child).' 6 ' Thus, the symptom lists might lead a patient
to believe she has been sexually abused, even if the only symptoms that
match are the more innocuous ones that could also reflect a myriad
of other problems or experiences.' 62
Skeptics also criticize the techniques that involve the patient "tell-
ing a story" about what might have happened. 163 Imagistic work, jour-
nal writing and art therapy all share this feature.' 64
 Telling or imagining
what might have happened, Loftus argues, encourages patients to
depart from the realm of what they know and to indulge in fantasy and
imagination.'" This blurred distinction between memory and imagina-
tion may become problematic if the memories retrieved in this fashion
are relied upon for their historical truth.'"
The use of group therapy also draws criticism from the skeptics.' 67
Group therapy, they argue, creates a different kind of pressure than
any exerted by the therapist alone.' 68
 The patient is placed in an
environment in which all of her peers either have recovered or are
attempting to recover memories of childhood sexual abuse.'" This
156 See id.
157 E.g., Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 158.
158 /d. at 151.
159 /d. at 158.
16° See id. at 160; LOFTUS & KETcatam, supra note 3, at 152-53.
161 Lovrus & K#:TCHAM, supra note 3, at 156.
162
 See id.
163 /d. at 158.
"''See supra notes 64-78 for description of therapeutic techniques.
165
 LOFTUS & KETCFIAM, supra note 3, at 158.
166 See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 160.
167 Lorrus & KrrctiAm, supra note 3, at 169.
168 See id. at 170.
169 Id.
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environment, they argue, combined with the other suggestions or cues
from the therapist, creates an expectation in the patient's mind that
she, too, should recover a memory of sexual abuse.'"
All of these techniques, skeptics argue, involve some degree of
suggestion and a high degree of speculation and imagination."' If the
patient is validated at each step, even fantasies or dreams begin to take
on the form of a real, independent memory.'" People on both sides
of the debate tend to agree that therapy is a search for healing, not
historical truth.'" The primary concern of the therapists is not inves-
tigating the historical truth of a memory, and they are therefore un-
likely to counter the effects of suggestive and speculative techniques
with questions and discussions that would more thoroughly probe the
veracity of the patient's reports: 74
Even if the level of suggestiveness in therapy is low, according to
skeptics, the nature of the therapeutic relationship itself can influence
the patient's memory and encourage the emergence of a false mem-
ory.'" Since Freud's writings and theories first became prominent, the
psychoanalytical profession has recognized that transference plays an
important role in psychotherapy. 176 The theory of transference rests on
the premise that patients in therapy see their therapist not as a de-
tached professional, but as a representation of important childhood
caretakers about whom the patient still has unresolved emotional is-
sues.'" This transference influences the content of what a patient says
to a therapist because the patient is searching for certain kinds of
responses from the therapist, depending on who or what the therapist
is supposed to represent.'" Thus, if a patient is under the pull of a
strong transference with his or her therapist, the power of even a slight
suggestion from the therapist might be enough to produce an altered
or false memory: 79
I'm See id.
171 See id. at 141; Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 158.
172 See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 162-63.
173 See id. at 161; Paul R. McHugh, "Recovered Memory": Exploring the Confusion, NEwsimv,
June 30, 1994, at 6 (citing study indicating that 50% of therapists say they make no effort to
distinguish between true and false memory even when criminal actions are involved).
174 See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 161; McHugh, supra note 173, at 6.
175 See Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1244-45, 1246.
176 /d. at 1244.
1 " Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1244; see SPV,NCE, supra note 61, at 94-95.
173 SPENCE, supra note 61, at 95. "Under the press of a strong transference .. . what the
patient is saying about the past must be translated into what he is demanding of the present. If
he needs to be pitied . . he might exaggerate the misery of his childhood; if he wants to be
praised for being an exceptional analytic patient, he might generate a crystal-clear memory of
an infantile event." Id.
179 See id.
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Though inaccuracies in the details of memory do not lead to the
conclusion that whole memories can appear out of nowhere with no
factual basis, some preliminary studies, as well as anecdotal evidence,
suggest that whole memories can be implanted in a person's mind.'"
One of the more famous accounts of a false memory comes from child
psychologist Jean Piaget, who remembered very clearly an attempted
kidnapping of him when he was two years old. 1e' This memory was vivid
and detailed, and Piaget never questioned its authenticity.' 82
 When he
was fifteen, however, the nurse who had been with him that day wrote
to his parents and confessed that she had made the entire story up.'"
Thus, Piaget had absorbed the information initially given him by his
nurse and his parents and transformed it into what seemed an inde-
pendent memory of the event.'"
Another example of an implanted memory comes from the case
of Paul Ingram, a man accused of sexually abusing his daughters and
participating in satanic rituals.' 85
 During the investigation, Ingram re-
peatedly responded to the accusations by denying them, then thinking
about it, recovering a detailed memory of the events, and confessing.'"
Psychologist Richard Ofshe was hired by the prosecution to assist with
the interviewing of Ingram and his family.' 87 As a test of Ingram's
credibility, Ofshe fabricated a false scenario of a particular act of abuse
that Ingram's children said never happened.' 88
 Ingram's response to
this scenario was exactly the same as his response to the others: he
claimed no memory of it, then went to think and "pray on" the issue,
and returned with a detailed memory and a confession.' 89
Initial observations from a study conducted by Dr. Elizabeth
Loftus, a psychology professor at the University of Washington, also
indicate that implanting an entire false memory is possible.'" Loftus
attempted to implant in her subjects a memory of being lost in a
shopping mall at a young age. 191
 During the initial observations, sub-
1811 Loftus, supra note 1, at 531. But see Karen A. Olio, Truth in Memory, 49 AM. PSYCHOL.
442,442 (1994) (arguing in response to Loftus's information that no evidence exists to show that
something as traumatic as a memory of sexual abuse can be implanted in a person's mind),
181 LUVI- US & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 76-77.
182 Id.
185 1d.
184 ,rd.
185 Loftus, supra note 1, at 532-33.
188 Id. at 533.
I 87 /d.
la8 Id.
189 1d.
' 9m Lovrus & KWtCHAM, supra note 3, at 97-99; Loftus, supra note 1, at 532.
181 Loftus, supra note 1, at 532.
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jects were given descriptions of four events occurring at around age
five, three of which were true and one of which was entirely fabri-
cated. 192 They were instructed to write about all four events every day
for five days, telling any facts or details remembered, and writing "I
don't remember" at any time when no memory was forthcoming.'"
One subject, Chris, provided additional details to the false memory
each day in the five day journal, including descriptions of people's
clothing and actions, his own feelings, and an entirely added memory
of what a particular person said to him.' 94
 A few weeks later, Chris was
asked to rate the four memories on how clear they were.'" The false
shopping mall memory received the second highest rating for clarity.'"
Finally, Chris was informed that one of the four memories was false. 197
When asked to guess which one, he selected one of the real memo-
ries.'" Upon being told that the shopping mall memory was the false
one, he had difficulty believing it, insisting that he had memories of
the event. W9 Researchers inspired a similar reaction in twenty percent
of the subjects involved in this study. 2"
In addition, the biology of memory provides some indication that
a recovered memory might be hopelessly entangled with imagination
and fan tasy. 201 Stephen Kosslyn, a researcher at Harvard, found that
the brain area involved with perceiving an image and storing it is the
same area involved in imagining an image. 202
 Thus, the accuracy of a
retrieved memory might be legitimately in question, because actual
perception and imagination share such close quarters in the brain and
might in termingle.2"
Finally, skeptics argue, some of the claims arising from recovered
memories simply defy belief"' A 1990 study of psychologists showed
that 800 (one-third of the sample) had treated at least one patient who
192
 Lovrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 97.
190 See id.
194 Id. at 97-98.
195 Id, at 98.
196 Id.
1117 Lorrus & KETCHAM, Supra note 3, at 98.
iss
199 Id. at 98-99. In order to ensure that the event had not actually happened, Loftus con-
ducted a similar procedure with Chris's mother, who came up with no memory of the incident.
Id. at 98.
200 Telephone Interview with Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, Professor of Psychology, Adjunct Professor
of Law, University of Washington (Mar. 26, 1995).
291 Kandel & Kandel, supra note 102, at 38.
202 Li
209
214 jaroit, supra note 143, at 59; see Schooler, supra note 102, at 463.
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claimed to have been a victim of satanic ritual abuse.206 A California
referral service for survivors reports that it receives more than 5000
calls a year from people who believe they have been victims of satanic
ritual abuse. 206
 Many of these stories describe highly organized and
highly brutal rituals, involving numerous people and sacrifices of in-
fants, fetuses and adults. 201
 Yet, despite what appears to be an alarming
number of incidents, involving large numbers of people, law enforce-
ment agencies including the FBI have uncovered no remains of sac-
rificed infants, fetuses or adults, and no additional eyewitnesses. 2°8 The
combination of the bizarre nature of these reports and the complete
lack of physical evidence of such behavior lead many of the skeptics to
question the authenticity of the memories themselves:2c*
Additionally, many of the recovered memories that concern events
that occurred prior to age two lead some to question their veracity.210
According to researchers, the hippocampus, the area of the brain that
processes long term conscious memories, is not fully developed in hu-
mans until age three or four. 2" The human brain may not be capable
of processing and storing long term conscious memories of events that
occurred at a young age. 212 Thus, a memory of incest at such a young
age may be inherently suspect. 2"
None of the skeptics have suggested that patients are consciously
fabricating their stories of abuse, and very few have seriously suggested
that therapists are deliberately implanting false memories in their
patients. 214
 Rather, doubters of repressed memory suggest that a com-
bination of inexperience, overzealousness and the utility of sexual
abuse as a simple answer to the complex issues that arise in therapy
has led a great number of therapists to unwittingly influence their
patients' memories.215
C. Unanswered Questions: The Current Status
of the Recovered Memory Debate
Although some studies have suggested that the initial repression
of a traumatic memory is a documented and even common occur-
203Jaroff, supra note 143, at 59.
206 Id.
2°7 Id.
2118 Id.
2°9 See Jaroff, supra note 143, at 59.
210 See Wartick, supra note 102, at 62.
2 " Id.; see also ThRR, supra note 81, at 226.
212 Wartick, supra note 102, at 62.
213 See id.
214 See TERR, supra note 81, at 162.
215 See Loftus, supra note 1, at 525; Reich, supra note 46, at 35; McNamee, supra note 139.
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rence, no similar studies exist to establish either that those memories
are accurate once they are retrieved or that all people who believe they
have such memories actually do, 2 ' 6
 The studies cited by both sides are
subject to attack as incomplete. 217
 Proponents of repressed memory
attack Loftus's shopping mall experiment as indeterminative, arguing
that the experience of being lost in a shopping mall does not begin to
approach the trauma of being molested as a child, and therefore
proves nothing about the possibility of implanting a memory of a real
trauma. 218
 The studies of known sexual abuse victims that show the
possibility and frequency of repression also have met with criticism. 219
According to Loftus, they do not show that people can repress the
kinds of repeated, prolonged incidents of abuse that appear in many
recovered memory cases. 22° Likewise, they do not show whether memo-
ries retrieved by people without a known history of sexual abuse are
accurate or reliable. 221
Meaningful experimental research on the accuracy and reliability
of recovered traumatic memories may be ethically impossible. 222 One
would need, perhaps, to study people who are known not to have been
sexually abused but who are experiencing emotional problems to de-
termine whether commonly used therapeutic techniques could pro-
duce memories of abuse. 223
 Two important factors make this kind of
study unlikely to happen. 224
 First, repressed memory advocates might
not accept that anyone can know for sure that they have never been
sexually abused. 225
 Second, the ethics of deliberately implanting a dev-
astating memory in an emotionally vulnerable subject are highly ques-
tionable. 226
216 See Schooler, supra note 102, at 452-53.
217 See id. at 453 (describing the claims on both sides of the debate that neither side has
proven the validity of its theories).
218 O1io, supra note 180, at 442.
213 See Loftus, supra note 1, at 521-22.
220
 Telephone Interview with Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, Professor of Psychology, Adjunct Professor
of Law, University of Washington (Mar. 26, 1995).
221 Id.
222 Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 133.
223
 Seel.orrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 90 (describing the type of information that might
be needed to prove whether memories of traumatic events could be implanted).
224 See id. at 100, 176.
225 See id. at 176 (quoting television personality Roseanne, who has claimed to have repressed
memories of childhood sexual abuse: When someone asks you 'were you sexually abused as a
child?' there are only two answers: one of them is 'yes' and one of them is 'I don't know.' You
can't say 'no.'").
226 See id. at 100. Dr. Loftus found resistance from the Human Subjects Committee to her
shopping mall experiment, because the Committee was concerned about the ethics of deliber-
ately implanting a false memory into a human subject. Id. With some modifications, including
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In the meantime, the rift in the professional community is omni-
present.227
 The issue pits clinical psychologists and their personal ex-
periences with their patients' vivid and painful memories against mem-
ory researchers and their academic understanding of memory. 228 The
recovered memory debate, according to a representative of the Ameri-
can Psychological Association ("APA"), is "tearing our membership
apart."228
 The APA established a panel of six professionals, representing
both sides of the debate, to prepare a report on the issue in an attempt
to reconcile these differences. 25o The panel released a preliminary
report in 1994, which indicated that, based on the latest research, it is
possible for victims of trauma to experience memory disturbance, but
it is also possible to construct false yet convincing pseudomemories for
events that never occurred. 28 ' Thus, even the efforts of the APA to bring
some kind of resolution to this issue have revealed only that both sides
may be right some of the time.
The debate in the psychological community over repressed mem-
ory leaves the legal profession with very little guidance as to the
reliability of these memories as evidence in a court of law. 232 Although
not all of these cases find their way into a courtroom, many do.'" Some
therapists encourage their patients to take legal action as a means of
taking control over their lives and "devictimizing" themselves. 234 Still
others are pushed to a civil suit by the cost of their ongoing treat-
ment. 235 As a result, large numbers of civil and criminal suits are finding
their way into the courtroom, often brought on the strength of a
recovered memory. 288 The consequences for a criminal defendant are
steep, as are the financial consequences for a defendant in a civil suit. 287
efforts to make sure subjects were not emotionally troubled in the beginning, the study was
approved. Id.
227 Muriel Dobbin, Jury's Still Out an Validity of Hidden Memories, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 9,
1994 at El.
228 Id.
229 M.
290 ,rd.
231 When Memories Collide, supra note • 46, at B33. According to Newsday, the report also
suggested that the phenomenon of recovered memory is a rare one, but the article did not define
what was meant by "rare." See id.
232 See id.
233 Id. at B33; see also Reich, supra note 46, at 33.
254 LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 173-74 (citing sections in two popular self-help
books, The Courage to Heal and Secret Survivors, dedicated to the costs and benefits of suing the
perpetrator); Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 140 n.59.
255 LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 174.
236 See Kanovitz, supra note 41, at 1193; Reich, supra note 46, at 33; When Memories Collide,
supra note 46, at B33.
257 See Loftus, supra note 1, at 518 (George Franklin convicted of first-degree murder on the
strength of his'daughter's recovered memory); Lorrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 261 (Paul
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Even for defendants who prevail in court, the financial and personal
cost of the process itself can be devastating.'" Therefore, courts have
good reason to evaluate the recovered memories that are the under-
pinnings of these legal battles and to consider the question of whether,
and under what circumstances, such memories make competent testi-
mony.239
Thus far, the competence of witnesses to testify to recently recov-
ered memories has been directly challenged only in situations where
the memories were recovered through hypnosis. 24° This may change,
however, as plaintiffs bring more actions in the wake of widespread
expansions to statutes of limitations.24 ' If confronted with a challenge
to memories recovered through therapy but without the use of hypno-
sis, courts may find guidance in the treatment of hypnotically refreshed
testimony over the past decade."'
III. HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY
When testimony based on hypnotically refreshed memories was
first challenged in the courts, courts did not consider the testimony
troublesome. 243
 The courts considered witnesses competent to testify
and considered the memory-refreshing process analogous to the use
of written memoranda to refresh recollection.'" The trier of fact was
entrusted with the responsibility, based on the witness's testimony, the
opposing party's cross-examination, and expert testimony on the reli-
ability of hypnosis, to determine the accuracy of the memories related
in the testimony.245
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Harding v. State was the
first case to squarely address the issue of admissibility of hypnotically
Ingram serving a 20 year sentence for rape as a result of his daughters' recovered memories and
his own subsequent recovered memory and confession); Brelis, supra note 16, at 1 (jury verdict
of $500,000 in damages on the strength of Jennifer Hoult's recovered memory).
2s8 See LOFTUS & KErcilAm, supra note 3, at 136-37. Doug Nagle, accused of sexual abuse on
the strength of his daughter's recovered memory, was ultimately acquitted of all charges. Id. at
136. During this process, however, his marriage disintegrated and all three of his children severed
all contact with him. Id.
239 See Ernsdorff 8c Loftus, supra note 38, at 162.
245 See, e.g., Borawiek v. Shay, 842 F. Supt.). 1501, 1505 (D. Conn. 1994), aff'd, 68 F.3d 597 (2d
Cir. 1995); McGlauflin v. State, 857 P.2d 366, 369 (Alaska CL App. 1993); State v. Varela, 817 P2d
731, 733 (N.M. CL App. 1991); West v. Howard, 601 N.E.2d 528, 531 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
241 See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 144-45; Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1193-94.
242
 Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 162, 165-66; see Barall, supra note 2, at 1486 n.47.
245 Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1252-53; see Harding v. State, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (Md. CL Spec.
App. 1968).
244 Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1252.
245 1d, at 1253.
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refreshed testimony. 246 Th -e Harding court held that the fact of hypnosis
was an issue of credibility, not admissibility, and that previously hypno-
tized witnesses were competent to testify. 247
 In Harding, the prosecut-
ing witness had serious gaps in her memory immediately after being
stabbed.248
 She underwent hypnosis before the trial in order to retrieve
her memory of the important details.'" At trial, she testified to the
memories she retrieved while under hypnosis including, among other
things, the identity of the defendant as her assailant. 250 The psycholo-
gist who hypnotized her also testified to the details of the hypnotic
session and to his own qualifications to perform such hypnosis:25 '
On appeal, the court reasoned that the witness stated she was
testifying from her own recollection, and the fact that she had told
different stories or had been hypnotized concerned only the weight
that should be given to her testimony. 252 Questions of weight and
credibility, the court reasoned, properly belonged to the trier of fact. 2"
Thus, the court held that the witness's hypnotically refreshed testimony
was admissible. 254
For almost a decade, numerous courts in other jurisdictions fol-
lowed the Harding rule, considering questions of the reliability of
hypnotically refreshed memory to be within the province of the jury
as a question of weight and credibility.255 During the late 1970s and
early 1980s, however, courts began increasingly to question the reliabil-
ity of hypnotically refreshed memory.256 Scientific literature began to
illuminate known dangers of hypnosis, and legal commentators began
to present these studies and opinions to the courts. 257
 Between 1980
and 1990, a majority of jurisdictions abandoned the original proposi-
tion that a hypnotized witness was presumed competent. 258
 Those ju-
246 1d. at 1252 n.292; see Harding, 246 A.2d at 306.
247 Harding, 246 A.2d at 306.
245 1d. at 305.
249 Id.
250 id.
251 Id. at 306-07.
252 Harding, 246 A.2d at 306.
253
254 Id.
255 See Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1252 n. 292.
256 See cases cited infra notes 330, 332, 333.
257 See generally Bernard L. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pre-Trial Hypnosis on a
Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L. Rev. 313 (1980); Martin T. Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis
in Court, 27 Ity'r'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311 (1979). Orne's article introduced
the procedural safeguards against unreliability that were later adopted by many courts which
declined to bar hypnotically refreshed testimony altogether. See State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 95-96
(N.J. 1981).
255 See cases cited infra notes 330, 332, 333.
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risdictions that abandoned the Harding rule treated hypnotically re-
freshed testimony in two different ways. 25° Some courts viewed hypnosis
as suspect and inherently unreliable and began to bar its admission
entirely. 26° Others considered hypnosis potentially but not consistently
reliable, and therefore required trial courts to make a pretrial finding
of reliability before admitting the testimony. 261
A. Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony as Inadmissible
Many of the courts that found hypnotically refreshed testimony
inherently unreliable and thus inadmissible rested their findings on
the applicability of the Frye requirement of general scientific. accep-
tance to hypnosis and hypnotically refreshed testimony. 262 In 1923, in
Frye v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that federal courts could admit testimony or
evidence based on a scientific procedure or theory only if the proce-
dure or theory was sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community. 263
 The language of the
Frye test has since been superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence
in the federal courts, but the principle that a procedure or theory must
be scientifically valid before evidence based on that procedure or
theory can be admissible remains in force. 264 In 1993, in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the United States Supreme Court held
that, in federal trials, the language of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
not Frye, controlled the admissibility of such evidence. 255
 The Court
held, however, that the trial judge retained the responsibility of deter-
mining the scientific validity of the underlying reasoning or method-
ology. 266 In reaching this determination, the Daubert Court held, the
trial court must consider whether the theory has been or can be tested,
whether it has been published and subjected to peer review, whether
it has attracted widespread acceptance in a relevant scientific commu-
nity, and its known or potential error rate. 267 Thus, while the Frye rule
of general acceptance as the only measure of admissibility has been
superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence in federal courts, under
239 See id. and accompanying text for description of different approaches.
260 See cases cited infra note 332.
261 See cases cited infra notes 330, 333.
262 See cases cited infra note 332.
263 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The evidence in question in Frye was expert testimony
about the results of a systolic blood pressure he detector test. Id.
26a
	 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794-95 (1993).
265 Id. at 2793.
266 Id. at 2796.
267 Id. at 2796-97.
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Dauber!, evidence based on a scientific theory or procedure must still
pass a preliminary test of validity. 268
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. Mack held
hypnotically refreshed testimony inadmissible because it failed to sat-
isfy the requirements of scientific acceptance of reliability under Frye. 269
In Mack, the prosecuting witness was originally brought to the hospital
with cuts in her vagina. 27° She first told doctors that she had been
involved in sexual activity, and later that she had been in a motorcycle
accident.27' Before the trial, she agreed to be hypnotized to recover her
memory of her assault. 272 After a hearing on the admissibility of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony, the trial court certified the question to
the state supreme court. 278 Five expert witnesses testified to the effects
and reliability of hypnosis, and numerous amici filed briefs on both
sides of the issue. 274
Relying on the expert testimony from the pretrial hearing, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota noted the recognized dangers of hypno-
sis.278 First, it stated that a hypnotized subject is highly susceptible to
suggestion, even where such suggestion is subtle or unintended. 276
Second, the court determined that a hypnosis subject is prone to
confabulate, or fill gaps, in order to present a coherent story. 277 Finally,
the court noted the expert testimony indicating that a memory pro-
duced under hypnosis, regardless of its truth, becomes hardened in
the subject's mind, giving that subject a heightened confidence in its
truth. 278 The court further noted that even practitioners of hypnosis
testified that hypnosis did not need to be historically accurate in order
to be therapeutically useful. 276 Thus, the court reasoned, because prac-
titioners do not necessarily seek historical, verifiable truth, the results
of their treatment may be suspect in the context of a courtroom. 28°
The court held that the standard of general acceptance by the
relevant scientific community established in Frye should apply to hyp-
268
 Id. at 2794-95.
269 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980).
270 Id. at 766.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 767.
278 Id. at 765.
274 Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 765-66.
275 Id. at 768-69.
276 1d. at 768.
'277 Id. at 768-69.
278 Id. at 769.
279 Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768.
280 Id.
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notically refreshed testimony:4'1 The court reasoned that, although
hypnosis was not strictly analogous to the results of mechanical testing
typically governed by Frye, the best expert testimony indicates that no
expert can determine whether memory induced by hypnosis is accu-
rate or true.282 In response to the prosecution's contention that admis-
sibility of the testimony should not be governed by Frye because it
involves an individual's statement of his or her own recollection rather
than a scientific procedure, the court reasoned that the hypnotized
witness's testimony is not equivalent to the testimony of regular wit-
nesses. 2" Hypnosis can bring forth "memories" that do not exist, and
the "hardening" of memory insulates the hypnotized witness from at-
tack on cross-examination, unlike normal, untainted memor y.284 Thus,
the court held that the Frye rule applied to hypnotically refreshed
testimony. 2" The court further held that, under that rule, the science
of hypnosis was too unreliable to warrant admission of such testi-
mony.286
In 1981, in State v. Mena, the Arizona Supreme Court held hyp-
notically refreshed testimony inadmissible:4'7 ln Mena, a victim/witness
who had inadequate memory of his attack agreed to undergo hypnosis
to recover his recollection of the event. 2" The court in Mena reviewed
the Harding decision and its progeny, noting the lack of analysis of the
dangers of hypnosis in those cases. 28° The court then identified flaws
in the two basic premises underlying Harding and its progeny.29° The
first premise was that the witnesses stated that they were testifying from
their own recollection. 291
 The second was that cross-examination would
enable a jury to make the appropriate determinations about the wit-
nesses's credibility. 292
 With respect to the first premise, the Mena court
reasoned that the evidence that suggests that a witness, after hypnosis,
has no way to tell what are true recollections and what are simply the
"' Id.
"2 Id.
283 Id. at 769.
2"4
	 292 N.W.2d at 769-70.
285 1d. at 768.
286 1d. at 772.
287G24 P.2d 1274,1279 (Ariz. 1981). This holding reversed the decision of the state court of
appeals, which cited "respectable authority for the proposition that hypnotically adduced testi-
mony is admissible, the fact of hypnosis affecting its credibility but not its admissibility." Id. at
1276. At this time, the majority of jurisdictions continued to follow the Harding rule. Id. at 1277.
288 /d. at 1276.
2X9
	 at 1277-78.
290 Id. at 1278.
29
292 Mena, 624 P.2d at 1278.
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product of hypnosis undermined the value of a witness's assertions that
the testimony reflected his or her own recollections. 293 The court fur-
ther declared that the second assumption was fatally undermined by
the authorities that show hypnosis subjects' increased belief in the
veracity of their refreshed memories, regardless of their actual truth,
making effective cross-examination impossible.294 Thus, the court held
that hypnotically refreshed testimony had been shown to be unreliable
and was therefore inadmissible at trial:295
B. Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony as Conditionally Admissible
Not all courts disturbed by the idea of hypnotically refreshed
testimony responded with a per se rule of inadmissibility. 296 In 1981,
the New Jersey Supreme Court decided State v. Hurd, creating pro-
cedural safeguards against unreliability that became widely used in
those jurisdictions that did not bar hypnotically refreshed testimony
entirely. 297 The New Jersey court held that hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony should be judged according to the standards of general scientific
acceptance, which could be accomplished by admitting the evidence
only when the hypnotist followed particular procedural safeguards
designed to ensure reliability. 298 In Hurd, the defendant was accused of
attacking and stabbing his ex-wife, Jane Sell, while she slept. 299 After
the incident, Ms. Sell was either unwilling or unable to describe her
assailant. 3" At the prosecutor's suggestion, she visited a psychiatrist and
underwent hypnosis in order to enhance her recollection of the inci-
dent."' Six days later, after some doubts about her identification and
considerable encouragement from both the psychiatrist and the inves-
tigating detective, she gave a statement to the police identifying the
defendant as her assailant. 302
295 Id.
294 Id.
295 id. at 1279. Also during 1981, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals overturned its
previous decision in Harding, noting the concerns expressed in other courts about the dangers
of hypnosis and reasoning that Maryland's post-Harding adoption of the Frye rule compelled the
application of Frye to hypnotically refreshed testimony. Polk v. Maryland, 427 A.2d 1041, 1047-48
(Md. CL Spec. App. 1981). The Polk court acknowledged that testimony is not itself a scientific
procedure, but stated that "[tihe induced recall of the witness ... cannot be disassociated from
the underlying scientific method." Id. at 1048,
295 See State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 95 (NJ. 1981).
297 M. at 96; see cases cited infra notes 330, 333.
298 Hurd, 432 A.2d at 92, 95.
299 Id. at 88.
AN Id.
5" I Id.
302 Id. at 89.
May 19961
	
RECOVERED MEMORY	 619
Before jury selection, the defendant moved to suppress Ms. Sell's
testimony, arguing that hypnosis fails to satisfy the standard for admis-
sibility of scientific evidence under Frye."3
 The trial court granted the
motion, finding the dangers of fantasy and confabulation during hyp-
nosis sufficient to preclude automatic admissibility of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony."' The prosecutor filed a motion seeking leave to
appeal the lower court's orders, which was granted by the state su-
preme court. 305
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court held, like the Mena
and Mack courts, that the Frye rule applied to hypnotically refreshed
testimony.'" The court analogized hypnosis to the use of a polygraph
or a voiceprint, and reasoned that the credibility of a hypnotized wit-
ness's recall depends on the reliability of the procedure used to pro-
duce that recall."7 Citing the suggestibility of the hypnotic subject, the
danger of confabulation, and the problematic "hardening" of memory
that occurs in hypnotic subjects, the court acknowledged significant
potential dangers of hypnosis."" The court stated, however, that this
conclusion did not require a finding that hypnosis is generally ac-
cepted as a means of reviving truthful or historically accurate recall in
order to admit hypnotically refreshed testimony."' The court reasoned
that, unlike polygraph tests, hypnosis was not used to obtain truth, but
to overcome amnesia and restore the memory of the witness.m° Thus,
a court need only find that hypnosis in a given circumstance will yield
recollections as accurate as those of an ordinary witness. 3" Eyewitness
memory, the court noted, is generally not overwhelmingly reliable, and
cross-examination is not always capable of revealing subtle distortions
in the memories of people who have never undergone hypnosis." 12
Based on this reasoning, the court held that a per se inadmissibility
rule would be unnecessarily broad and would exclude important evi-
dence that was at least as trustworthy as that of ordinary eyewitnesses. 3 i 3
The Hurd court went on to hold that trial courts can admit hyp-
notically refreshed testimony if the trial court finds that the use of
3" Hurd, 432 A.2d at 89.
" Id,
3f 15 Id. at 90.
308 M. at 91.
307 Id.
3" Hurd, 432 A.2d at 93.
3"3 Id. at 92.
3" Id.
311 Id.
312
 Id. at 95.
313 Hurd, 432 A.2d at 94,
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hypnosis under the particular circumstances was reasonably likely to
result in recall comparable in accuracy to normal human memory.'"
In reaching this result, the trial court must consider first whether the
type of memory loss involved would be likely to yield normal recall
if hypnosis were properly employed. 315 If the memory loss was of such
a type, the trial court must consider the technique employed and
whether it was reasonably reliable. 31s To this end, the Hurd court
adopted six procedural requirements to aid the trial courts in this
determination. 317 These requirements included the qualifications of
the hypnotist, the hypnotist's independence from the parties, the keep-
ing of a record of information given to the hypnotist and of all contacts
between the hypnotist and the subject, and the absence of other people
during the session.m
In 1984, in State v. Iwakiri, the Idaho Supreme Court held that
trial courts may admit hypnotically refreshed testimony only upon a
finding, after review of the totality of the circumstances, that the
proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable."The Iwakiri court declined
to adopt the Hurd safeguards as absolute requirements, holding in-
stead that those safeguards should be considered by the trial court in
its overall determination of reliability. 320 In Iwakiri, a witness in a kid-
napping trial had undergone hypnosis twice before the trial, at the
suggestion of the police."' A police officer conducted the first hypnosis
session with investigators present, and a psychologist conducted the
second.'"
The Iwakiri court began its reasoning with the general rule ex-
pressed in the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Idaho Rules of
Id. at 95.
315 Id. at 95-96. The court noted the testimony of an expert witness who indicated that certain
types of memory loss, such as that produced by extreme trauma, are more susceptible to recall
than others, such as refinement of the details of a subject's existing memory. Id.
316
 Id. at 96.
117 id. at 96-97.
318 Hurd, 432 A.2d at 96-97. The exact requirements are: 1) a psychiatrist or psychologist
experienced in the use of hypnosis must conduct the session; 2) the professional must be
independent of and not regularly employed by the prosecutor, investigator or defense; 3) any
information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement personnel prior to the session must be
recorded; 4) before inducing hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain from the subject a detailed
description of the facts as the subject remembers them; 5) all contacts between the hypnotist and
the subject must be recorded; and 6) only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during
the session. Id.
119 682 P.2d 571, 578 (Idaho 1984).
32° Id.
32 ' Id. at 573.
322 Id.
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Evidence that witnesses are presumed competent to testify.'" Notwith-
standing this general rule of competency, the court reasoned that the
recognized dangers of hypnosis, in particular the likelihood of sugges-
tion, the danger of confabulation, and the difficulty of "memory hard-
ening" were sufficient to warrant some restriction on hypnotically
refreshed testimony. 324 The court did not base its decision on the Frye
rule, but instead on the general problem of reliability presented by
hypnosis. 325 The court reviewed the three basic approaches to such
testimony taken by other jurisdictions: the Harding rule of per se
admissibility, the Mack rule of per se inadmissibility, and the Hurd
rule of admissibility contingent on compliance with procedural safe-
guards. 328 The court reasoned that all three of these rules were too
rigid, and that each addressed one important consideration to the
exclusion of all others. 327 For example, the Hurd rule, the court stated,
itself served as a per se rule because a previously hypnotized witness
could testify only if the hypnosis was performed in absolute compliance
with the safeguards. 328 The court reasoned that it could foresee circum-
stances where the witness's testimony would be reliable even if the
hypnotist had not followed all of the safeguards. 929 Thus, the Iwakiri
court held that a trial court must determine the reliability of hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony after applying a totality of the circumstances
test, in which guidelines similar to the Hurd safeguards should be
considered and weighed but should not be dispositive.a"
3" Id. at 575.
324 Iwakiri, 682 P.2d at 575-76, 578.
329 See id. at 575-76.
326 id. at 576-77.
327 1d. at 577.
329 1d. at 577-78.
329 lwakiri, 682 P.2d at 577.
339 See id. at 578. A number of courts have followed a similar approach to Iwakiri, incorpo-
rating the Hurd safeguards and additional factors, such as the existence of evidence corroborating
the proposed testimony, to be considered in a totality of the circumstances test of reliability. See
Chamblee v. State, 527 So. 2d 173, 177 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (holding that the trial court must
make a case by case determination of whether testimony had a basis independent of the hypnosis);
People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1017 (Colo. 1987) (holding that the trial court must make a
determination of reliability considering the totality of the circumstances, including Hurd safe-
guards, the type of memory loss involved and the existence of corroborating evidence); State v.
Johnston, 529 N.E.2d 898, 906 (Ohio 1988) (holding that the trial court must determine, under
the totality of the circumstances, whether testimony was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission,
and may consider Hurd safeguards); Zani v. State, 758 S.W.2d 233, 243-44 (Tex. Crim, App. 1988)
(holding that trial court must make an assessment of reliability and should consider Hurd
safeguards as well as the type of memory loss involved and the existence of corroborating
evidence); State v. Armstrong, 329 N.W.2d 386, 394 & n.23 (Wis. 1983) (holding that the trial
court must review procedure for impermissible suggestiveness and may use Hurd safeguards as
guidelines).
622	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 37:591
Since Hurd, most jurisdictions have retreated from the Harding
rule of per se admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony."' Many
have adopted the rationale of Mena and Mack, finding hypnosis so in-
herently unreliable that the testimony must be excluded altogether." 2
Others have adopted an approach similar to that of the Hurd court,
requiring pretrial determinations of reliability before admitting the
testimony. 3" A small minority continue to hold the view that such
witnesses are competent to testify, and that any question of weight and
credibility belongs to the jury as the trier of fact.tm
Recently, South Carolina has taken a different approach, rejecting the Hurd guidelines and
creating its own test for reliability. State v. Evans, 450 S.E.2d 47, 51 (S.C. 1994). In Evans, the
court held that hypnotically refreshed testimony should be evaluated by its consistency with
pre-hypnotic statements, the existence of considerable circumstantial evidence corroborating the
testimony and the extent to which the witness's responses appear to be automatic. Id.
331 See cases cited supra note 330 and infra notes 332, 334.
882 See Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1255 & n.303. For cases holding that Frye applies to
hypnotically refreshed testimony and that hypnosis is not sufficiently accepted as reliable to
warrant admission, see Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 134-36 (Alaska 1986); People v. Shirley,
723 P.2d 1354, 1375, 1383-84 (Cal. 1982); Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 195-96 (Fla. 1989);
People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 517, 518 (Ill. 1989); State v. Collins, 464 A.2d 1028, 1034, 1044
(Md. 1983); Commonwealth v. Kater, 447 N.E.2d 1190, 1193, 1195 (Mass. 1983); People v.
Gonzales, 329 N.W.2d 743, 746, 747-48 (Mich. 1982); Alsbach v. Bader, 700 S.W.2d 823, 824, 829
(Mo. 1985); State v. Peoples, 319 S.E.2d 177, 187 (N.C. 1984) (using the reasoning of Frye and
overturning its decision in State v. McQueen allowing hypnotically refreshed testimony); State v.
Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1210-11 (Utah 1989); State v. Martin, 684 P.2d 651, 654 (Wash. 1984).
Other courts have held hypnotically refreshed testimony inadmissible without explicit reference
to Frye. See State v. Moreno, 709 P.2d 103, 105 (Haw. 1985) (holding that previously hypnotized
witnesses may only testify to matters which can be shown to have been recalled prior to hypnosis);
Strong v. State, 435 N,E.2d 969, 970 (Ind. 1982) (holding that hypnotically refreshed testimony
is inadmissible because it is inherently unreliable and has low probative value); State v. Haislip,
701 P.2d 909, 925-26 (Kan. 1985) (holding that hypnotically refreshed testimony is inadmissible
because it is unreliable); State v. Palmer, 313 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Neb. 1981) (holding that hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony is inadmissible until hypnosis gains scientific acceptance as a reliable
means of refreshing memory); Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984)
(holding that testimony tainted by hypnosis is inadmissible until it gains general acceptance as a
method for accurate retrieval of memory); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436 A,2d 170, 178 (Pa.
1981) (holding that hypnotically refreshed testimony is inadmissible until court is presented with
more conclusive proof of its reliability).
333 See cases cited supra note 330 (cases incorporating Hurd guidelines as part of a totality of
the circumstances test of reliability); see also House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815, 819, 826-27 (Miss.
1984) (applying Hurd standards as prerequisite to admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony, with the additional requirement of corroborating testimony or physical evidence); State v.
Beachum, 643 P.2d 246, 252-53 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (declining to apply Frye test and adopting
Hurd standards as prerequisite to admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony); State v.
Adams, 418 N.W.2d 618, 624 (S.D. 1988) (adopting Hurd safeguards as prerequisite to admissi-
bility of hypnotically refreshed testimony).
334 See State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756, 759 (La. 1983) (holding that hypnotically refreshed
testimony is admissible and that issues of credibility can be explored through cross-examination
and expert testimony); State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138, 151 (N.D. 1983) (holding that hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony is admissible and that issues of credibility can be explored through cross-
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C. Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony in the Context of Therapy
Very few of these courts have been faced with the issue of memo-
ries recovered during therapeutic hypnosis, as opposed to those recov-
ered through forensic hypnosis undertaken specifically to enhance
recollection of a specific, already identified event."' Memories recov-
ered during therapeutic hypnosis present a slightly different problem
than those recovered or enhanced by forensic hypnosis. Although a
prosecutor preparing for litigation can be expected to have knowledge
of the procedural requirements for hypnotically refreshed testimony
prior to having a witness hypnotized, a person undergoing hypnosis as
therapy may have no idea that the issues he or she "remembers" will
even come up during hypnosis." 6
 Thus, it is problematic to rest the
admissibility of such testimony on a series of standards that must be
met before and during hypnosis."' Furthermore, although hypnosis in
a therapeutic context still poses a risk of unreliability, some of the
dangers guarded against by procedural safeguards are less likely to be
relevant, such as the influence of the prosecutor or the investigating
detectives on the process.'" Although some courts faced with this issue
ultimately have allowed the testimony because of factual circumstances
indicating reliability, none have abandoned the notion that admissibil-
ity requires some preliminary determination of reliability.'"
examination and expert testimony); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Tenn. Critn. App.
1981) (holding that hypnotically refreshed testimony is admissible and fact of hypnosis affects
credibility, not admissibility); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1282, 1284 (Wyo. 1982) (holding
that hypnotically refreshed testimony is admissible and that an attack on credibility is the proper
method to determine the value of the testimony).
336 See, e.g., liorawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1505 (D. Conn. 1994), affd, 68 F.3d 597 (2d
Cir. 1995); McGlauflin v. State, 857 P.2d 366, 378 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993); State v. Varela, 817 P.2d
731, 732 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); West v. Howard, 601 N.E.2d 528, 532, 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991),
336 See Varela, 817 P.2d at 734 (noting that it was significant that a hypnotic subject's revela-
tions were "totally unanticipated" by the hypnotist).
337 See id.
338 See id.
"9 See Borawick, 842 F. Supp, at 1505 (holding that testimony refreshed by therapeutic
hypnosis must be evaluated according to an abbreviated version of the Hurd safeguards, looking
at the hypnotist's qualifications, whether the hypnotist added new elements to the subject's
description and the existence of a permanent record of the hypnosis); McGlauflin, 857 P.2d at
378 (holding that testimony refreshed during therapeutic hypnosis is admissible if the circum-
stances of the hypnosis make it likely that the witness's memory has not been enhanced or altered
by the hypnosis); Varela, 817 P.2d at 732 (holding that strict compliance with procedural safe-
guards was not required for admissibility of testimony refreshed by therapeutic hypnosis, but that
the trial court should determine under all the circumstances whether the use of hypnosis was
reasonably likely to result in recall comparable to normal human memory); West, 601 N.E.2d at
533 (applying the Hurd standards to testimony refreshed by therapeutic hypnosis and holding
that the witness's testimony was unreliable and should he barred).
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In 1991, the Court of Appeals of Ohio in West v. Howard addressed
the issue of memories enhanced by therapeutic hypnosis. 34° The West
court utilized the Hurd standards in holding that the testimony re-
freshed by therapeutic hypnosis was inadmissible. 341
 In West, the plain-
tiff had been involved in an automobile accident and could not re-
member many of the details surrounding the accident. 342
 During the
course of treatment with a social worker for an unrelated eating disor-
der, the social worker employed a technique called "self-hypnosis" so
that the plaintiff could remember details of the accident in order to
deal with the emotions arising from that accident. 343
 The rule govern-
ing admissibility of hypnotically refreshed evidence in Ohio resembled
the Iwakiri rule, requiring trial courts to determine whether, under the
totality of circumstances, the proposed testimony was sufficiently reli-
able to merit admission. 3" The Hurd safeguards were included within
this rule as guidelines for the trial court to follow in making its deter-
mination. 3" In addition to these guidelines, the trial courts were to
consider other factors that could affect reliability, such as the existence
of corroborating evidence, the appropriateness of using hypnosis for
the type of memory loss involved, and any motive that the subject
might have for remembering or forgetting the events in question.346
In applying these standards, the West court noted that the plaintiff
had no memory at all prior to her self-hypnosis, and that the therapist
was fully involved in the memory retrieval process, despite the label
"self-hypnosis."347
 The court also noted that the therapist strongly mo-
tivated the plaintiff to remember the details, because the therapist told
her she needed to do so in order to deal with her emotions about the
accident and overcome her eating disorder. 348 Furthermore, the court
noted that the therapist was not independent or objective, despite the
fact that hypnosis was not employed specifically in anticipation of
litigation.349
 In fact, the court stated that the therapeutic nature of the
34°601 N.E.2d at 529.
341 Id. at 533.
342 ./d. at 529,530.
343 Id. at 530. The defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent the plaintiff from testifying
to any information recalled during this self-hypnosis, which was granted by the trial court. Id.
The defendant subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted and
appealed by the plaintiff. Id. at 530-31.
344
 Id. at 531-32 (citing State v. Johnston, 529 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1988)).
345 West, 601 N.E.2d at 532.
346 Id.
m7 Id. at 532-33.
"3 Id. at 533.
549 Id.
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hypnosis was itself troublesome." 5° The court noted that the therapist's
sole purpose in initiating the hypnosis was to better the plaintiff's
emotional health, and thus was not primarily concerned with the
accuracy of the memories." 51 The court implied that the therapist was
thus less likely to follow the kinds of procedures that attempt to maxi-
mize the accuracy and truth of the memories involved." 5z Finally, the
court reasoned that a hypnotic technique where the subject controls
the memory retrieval process could never meet the reliability test as
applied in Ohio."' The guidelines, the court reasoned, require a neu-
tral qualified professional and documentation of the entire process." 54
Thus, the court applied the guidelines as created and held that ther-
apeutic self-hypnosis is inherently unreliable, and as such, inadmis-
sible.'"
In 1993, in McGlauflin v. State, the Alaska Court of Appeals also
was faced with a question of memories refreshed by therapeutic, non-
forensic hypriosis."5" The McGlauflin court held that the hypnotically
refreshed testimony in this case was admissible, but that testimony
refreshed by therapeutic hypnosis still needed to meet a minimum
threshold of reliability." 7
 In McGlauflin, the prosecuting witness un-
derwent hypnosis in an effort to control her weight and self-esteem
problems."58 Although the witness's mother suspected that her daugh-
ter had been abused in some way, she had no evidence and the abuse
was not reported to the authorities until after the witness had been in
therapy for three years." 59 The witness apparently did not have trouble
remembering the abuse independently before hypnosis, but was reluc-
tant to tell anyone." 50 Her mother informed the hypnotist of her suspi-
cions before the session."' During the session, the hypnotist asked the
witness if she could see the man who molested her, to which the witness
responded, "Yes."'" When asked if she had anything to say to him, she
responded, "No.""' The witness made no further mention of the mo-
35° See West, 601 N.E.2d at 533.
351 Id.
352 See id.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 West, 601 N.E.2d at 533.
356 857 P.2d 366, 369 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
357 id. at 376, 380.
359 1d. at 369, 373.
359 Id. at 372-73.
36° Id. at 373.
361 McGlauflin, 857 P.2d at 373.
362 Id. at 374,
963 Id.
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lestation during the session.364 At trial, the defendant sought to sup-
press all of the witness's testimony about the abuse because her mem-
ory had been tainted by the prior hypnosis. 365
Alaska's rule governing the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony at this time more closely resembled the Mena and Mack rules
than the Hurd rule in that it barred all hypnotically adduced testi-
mony.366 The court in McGlauflin declined to make a complete excep-
tion for therapeutic hypnosis, reasoning that hypnosis performed for
nonforensic purposes may also result in altered memory. 367 The court
did, however, hold that the exclusion of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony applies only when the circumstances and the results of the
hypnosis demonstrate a likelihood that the hypnotized witness's memo-
ries have been enhanced or altered. 368
 In reconciling this holding with
the previous rule of complete exclusion, the court reasoned that when-
ever a witness has been hypnotized for forensic purposes, such circum-
stances always exist, thus eliminating the need for a determination by
the trial court. 369
 In this case, however, the circumstances surrounding
the witness's hypnosis did not raise a presumption that her memory
had been enhanced or altered by hypnosis.'" She had never forgotten
her abuse, she had been hypnotized once in order to address a sepa-
rate issue, and the only mention of sexual abuse during the session
were two questions that yielded no real information. 37 ' Thus, the court
held that the prosecuting witness was properly allowed to testify.'72
Since 1980, a significant majority of jurisdictions have found hyp-
nosis unreliable as a means of retrieving memory and have required
either a bar on the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness or a
preliminary determination of reliability before admitting such testi-
mony.'" Thus far, this premise has not been changed by arguments
that therapeutic hypnosis is less suggestive and more reliable than
forensic hypnosis, although courts in some instances have allowed the
testimony because the particular circumstances indicated reliability. 374
m'4 Id.
363 Id. at 369.
36€ See McGlauflin, 857 P.2d at 369, 371 (citing Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986)).
367 Id. at 375, 376.
368
 Id. at 378.
369 Id.
3" Id. at 379.
371 McGlauflin, 857 P.2d at 374, 380.
372 Id. at 379, 380.
575
 See cases cited supra notes 330, 332, 333.
"4 Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1505 (D. Conn. 1994), affd, 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir.
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IV. MEMORIES RECOVERED THROUGH THERAPY:
THREE ALTERNATIVES
To the extent that a memory is recovered as a result of therapeutic
hypnosis, the admissibility of testimony about the contents of that
memory should be governed by the existing rules governing hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony.375
 If confronted with a challenge to the tes-
timony of a witness who recovered memories of sexual abuse during
therapy but without the use of hypnosis, courts could take one of three
approaches based on the current treatment of hypnotically refreshed
testimony." First, a court could consider the witness competent to
testify, and rely on cross-examination and expert testimony to test the
accuracy of the memory, as a minority of courts continue to do with
hypnotically refreshed testimony. 377
 Although this approach is consis-
tent with the general rule that witnesses are presumed competent and
would allow the trier of fact to consider relevant evidence, it does not
address the very real danger that the memories are the product of
suggestion and inaccurate or wholly erroneous.
Second, a court could consider therapy as an intervening process
that has not been accepted as a reliable means of retrieving accurate
memories and conclude that testimony about memories retrieved dur-
ing therapy is not admissible at all." Although this approach would
protect a defendant from a conviction or liability based only on unre-
liable evidence, it also carries some serious problems. Therapy, while
it may be suggestive, does not involve the altered state of conscious-
ness that hypnosis does, and thus memories recovered during therapy
might be closer to "normal" memories than those recovered under
hypnosis. Because testimony about normal memories is liberally admit-
ted in spite of its frequent unreliability, courts may be unwilling to take
the drastic step of excluding eyewitness testimony just because it has
been subject to some degree of influence or suggestion. Finally, courts
are unlikely to adopt a rule of evidence that would, in effect, nullify
recent expansions in statutes of limitations designed to allow access to
the courts for adult survivors of sexual abuse.
1995); McGlauflin, 857 P.2d at 369; State v. Varela, 817 P.2d 731, 732 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); West
v. Howard, 601 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
375
 See Borawick, 842 F. Supp. at 1505; McGlauflin, 857 P.2d at 369; Varela, 817 P.2d at 731;
West, 601 N.E.2d at 533.
976 See cases cited supra notes 330, 332-34.
"7 See cases cited supra note 334.
978 See cases cited supra note 332.
628	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 (Vol. 37:591
Third, a court could consider memories recovered during therapy
potentially but not consistently reliable, and require a pretrial deter-
mination of reliability before admission of the testimony.'" Although
such determinations would involve additional litigation and expense
to the parties, this approach seems to strike an appropriate balance
between the need to admit all relevant and reliable evidence and the
need to protect both civil and criminal defendants from liability or
conviction based on unreliable or untrue evidence.
A. Recovered Memory Testimony as per se Admissible
The first approach to a challenge to recovered memory testimony
would be to presume the witness competent and rely on cross-exami-
nation and expert testimony about repression to test the credibility of
the witness's memory.'" Both tradition and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence favor this approach."' In most instances a witness is presumed
competent to testify, and the test for determining competency when
challenged is minimal."' Courts often allow very young children to
testify, as well as people of limited intelligence and biased and self-
interested witnesses whose information may not be very reliable."'
Courts have long understood the foibles and inaccuracies of normal
(nonrepressed) memory, and have accepted the premise that testi-
mony need not be infallible to be competent.'"
If recovered memory is seen as simply another gradation of nor-
mal, fallible human memory, there may be little justification for ex-
cluding testimony based on that memory.'" The liberal rules of com-
petency reflected in the Federal Rules of Evidence reflect a general
"See cases cited supra notes 330, 333.
s" See State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138, 138 (N.D. 1983); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280,
1282, 1283 (Wyo. 1982).
381 See FED. R. EVID. 601. Rule 601 provides:
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these
rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a
claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision, the competency
of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law,
Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority."); Brown, 337 N.W.2d at 151;
Chapman, 638 P.2d at 1284.
382 See Brown, 337 N,W.2d at 151; Chapman, 638 P.2d at 1284.
383 See FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee's note ("A witness wholly without capacity is
difficult to imagine. The question is one particularly suited to the jury as one of weight and
credibility ... ,"),
384 See id.; Broom, 337 N.W.2d at 151.
383 See Brown, 337 N.W.2d at 151; Chapman, 638 P.2d at 1284.
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policy favoring inclusion of relevant evidence. 386 The treatment of
previously hypnotized witnesses may be a rare exception to this rule,
based upon specific and well established concerns about their reliabil-
ity."7 Unlike hypnosis, the flaws associated with the retrieval of re-
pressed memories are the same flaws associated with the retrieval and
articulation of nonrepressed memory. Although the individual may be
subject to suggestion by his or her therapist, all witnesses are subject
to suggestion by friends, family, lawyers, the media and other outside
influences."8 A person might be encouraged by the expressed goals or
expectations of the therapist to confabulate, or fill in gaps in his or
her story, but any witness might feel pressure from any number of
sources to produce a coherent story."' Finally, if repressed memory is
simply a variation on normal memory, there is no reason to believe
that an individual is any more likely to become convinced of the
veracity of his or her story through the process of retrieving a long-
buried memory than a witness with nonrepressed memories who thinks
he or she remembers things a certain way and becomes convinced that
the memory is correct. 39°
Furthermore, it can be argued that any restriction on the testi-
mony of recovered memory witnesses would effectively block legal
action against perpetrators, rewarding child abusers and making a
nullity out of the recent expansions in statutes of limitations."' Judicial
and legislative expansions of those statutes were made in response to
the fact that adult survivors of incest were effectively blocked from
seeking any legal redress from their abusers."' To exclude these victims
from testifying would recreate the precise problem that those changes
were designed to remedy. 393
Finally, unlike the generally accepted view of hypnosis, experts in
the psychological community do not agree that recovered memory is
unreliable. 894 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, courts were faced with
overwhelming evidence indicating that hypnosis was fraught with dan-
gers, including studies that showed subjects purporting to "recall"
386 See Fan, R. EVill. 601 advisory committee's note.
387 See State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768-69 (reaching its decision in part based on exhaus-
tive expert testimony and extensive amicus brief's on the dangers of hypnosis).
388 Brown, 337 N.W.2d at 151; Olio, supra note 180, at 442.
389 See Brown, 337 N.W.2d at 151.
390 See Olio, supra note 180, at 442.
391 See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 144, for discussion of the reasoning behind the
changes in statutes of limitations.
392 See id.
393 See id.
394 See id. at 162; Schooler, supra note 102, at 453.
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events that were supposed to occur ten years in the future. 395 In the
case of recovered memory, a large body of professionals are convinced
of the accuracy of the memories, and no conclusive studies have con-
tradicted them.s96
 Instead, there are competing theories supported by
anecdotal evidence and experimental studies that prove nothing more
than that recovered memories are no less fallible than normal memo-
ries."' Thus, the compelling evidence that led most courts to make an
exception for hypnosis to the otherwise liberal rules of competency
may not exist in the case of recovered memories.
B. Recovered Memory Testimony as per se Inadmissible
The second approach, at the opposite end of the spectrum, would
hold that recovered memories are inherently unreliable and should be
inadmissible."8
 This approach finds some support in the reasoning of
many of the hypnosis cases, but only if the process of recovering a
memory through therapy is seen as an intervening science that must
be evaluated for its reliability and general acceptance. 399 Once therapy
begins to interfere with the witness's normal memory functioning, the
results may carry the same dangers as hypnosis, and the controversy
within the mental health profession shows a distinct lack of general
acceptance of the reliability of those results. 49"
"5 See People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1379 (Cal. 1982) (citing studies in which subjects
underwent age "progression," where they were made to believe they were living ten years in the
future, and reported their future "memories" with as much conviction as past memories).
596 See Lovrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 209; TEuR, supra note 81, at 15, 40; Schooler,
supra note 102, at 456.
397 See Olio, supra note 180, at 442.
"8 See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 162.
399 See Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 134 (Alaska 1986) (reasoning that the testimony of
previously hypnotized witnesses could not be logically disassociated from the underlying tech-
nique"). Recently, a trial court judge in New Hampshire ordered a hearing on the scientific
validity of recovered memory therapy, analogizing to the law concerning hypnotically refreshed
testimony and reasoning that, like hypnosis, memories recovered during therapy cannot be
logically disassociated from the underlying technique. State v. Hungerford, No. 94-S-045, slip op.
at 4-5 (Hillsborough County Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 1995). After a two-week hearing, the judge ruled
that the testimony of the victims could not be admitted because the theory of repressed and
recovered memory was not scientifically reliable. Id. at 22-24. But see Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 5
(1st Cir. 1995). There, the court upheld a verdict based largely upon a recovered memory. Id. at
5. The defendant argued on appeal that the admission of the expert's testimony without a finding
that the theories underlying her opinions were reliable constituted a "mistake" under Rule
60 (b)of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus grounds for relief from the judgment. Id.
at 3-4. The court held that the admission of her testimony was not a mistake as defined in Rule
60(b), and that the trial court was not required to make explicit rulings regarding expert
testimony in the absence of an objection. Id. at 5. The reliability of Jennifer's testimony was not
challenged. See id.
4°0 See id.; Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 162.
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The courts that have held hypnotically refreshed testimony inad-
missible because it fails to meet the Frye test of general scientific
acceptance have reasoned that hypnosis is a technique specifically
designed to affect the memory process."' Thus, the testimony of a
previously hypnotized witness is not merely that of a first hand memory,
but is at least in part the result of a scientific process." The testimony
therefore lives or dies according to the validity of that process. The
testimony of these witnesses, courts have held, "cannot be disassociated
from the underlying technique. n403
Similarly, therapeutic techniques employed to access hidden
memories can be seen as a process specifically designed to affect the
memory process." This kind of therapy rests on the premise that true
emotional healing cannot occur until the patient has exhumed and
confronted his or her painful memories."' Thus, the techniques em-
ployed and the kinds of questions asked are intended to influence the
patient's memory, just as hypnosis is designed to influence the subject's
memory." In this respect, it can be argued that the testimony of a
witness whose memory has been affected by such techniques must also
live or die according to the validity of those techniques and cannot be
logically disassociated from them."'
The therapeutic techniques found in the self-help literature and
in the recommendations of practicing therapists carry dangers similar
to hypnosis. 408
 In the first case, the techniques pose a danger of sug-
gestibility." From the time a therapist first asks the direct question, or
indicates that the patient's symptoms might be explained by childhood
sexual abuse, the patient is on notice that this is an acceptable, even
encouraged, explanation for his or her emotional problems."' If the
therapist employs imagistic work, journal writing or art therapy, there
is much room for suggestion in the choice of the image or idea that
serves as a "focal point" for these techniques. 4 " If a therapist believes
101
 See People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1375 (Cal. 1982).
402 See id.
103	 see also Contreras, 718 P.2d at 134.
4°4 See Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1375.
4° Loftus, supra note I. at 530.
"6
 See Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1375; Loftus, supra note 1, at 530.
4°7 See Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1375; Loftus, supra note 1, at 530.
408 See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text for discussion of common therapeutic
techniques,
409
 See Lorrus & Krrcuma, supra note 3, at 141; Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 158.
41(' See Loftus, supra note 1, at 526-27.
III See Lovrus & Kt:-rctadtst, supra note 3, at 160-61. See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying
text for explanation of the techniques which involve the use of a "focal point."
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that the patient's symptoms indicate sexual abuse, it is possible or even
probable that he or she will encourage the patient to select a focal
point that would help lead the patient to such a conclusion. 412 Each of
these techniques involves an interpretation stage, where the therapist
and the patient work together to decipher the meaning of what the
patient has envisioned, written or drawn. 413 If the therapist employs
dream work, a similar interpretation stage is involved. 414 Again, given
that the therapist believes sexual abuse to be implicated by the patient's
symptoms, there is much room for suggestion and leading in these
interpretation stages:" 5
Finally, the widespread use of group therapy involves a high de-
gree of suggestion:416 Patients are placed in an environment in which
all of their peers either have recovered, or are in the process of
recovering, long-buried memories of sexual abuse:117 Coupled with the
initial, and perhaps ongoing, message from the therapists that sexual
abuse is an acceptable explanation for their problems, the group
therapy environment could strongly influence the patients to believe
they have hidden memories of abuse:118 Contributing to the danger of
suggestion is the fact that the patients themselves are both emotionally
vulnerable because of the problems that led them to therapy in the
first place and eager for an explanation for those troubles. 419 They are
not in a trance, as hypnosis subjects are, but their emotional state and
their trust in their therapists might make them more vulnerable to
suggestion than a psychologically healthy person would be.
Secondly, these therapeutic techniques present a danger of con-
fabulation similar to, if not as intense as, that presented by hypnosis.
Again, the patient is admittedly not in a trance and therefore has
somewhat more power to resist the urge to confabulate than a subject
in hypnosis. Nevertheless, the patient is in an emotionally vulnerable
state and may be inclined to try to please the therapist. 42° The content
of what a patient says to a therapist is influenced by transference,
because the patient is searching for certain kinds of responses from
41.2 See LoFrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 160-61.
415 /d, at 156-62.
414 /d. at 159.
415 See id.
416 See id. at 170-71; Loftus, supra note I, at 527.
417 Lorrus & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 170-71; Loftus, supra note I. at 527.
418 See LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 170-71; Loftus, supra note 1, at 527.
415 See Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1249; Loftus, supra note 1, at 525; McNamee, supra note
139, at 1.
420 See Kanovitz, supra note 42, at 1248-49; Loftus, supra note 1, at 526; Reich, supra note
46, at 33.
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the therapist, depending on who or what the therapist is supposed to
represent.42 ' If the patient has received the message that sexual abuse
is an explanation the therapist will accept, he or she may feel a strong
pull to "fill in the gaps," as in hypnosis, to create a more coherent
stor y.422 For example, if a patient has a genuine memory of a particu-
larly painful conflict with her parents, it may not be beyond the bounds
of possibility for her to convince herself that she remembers a physical
aspect to that episode. The techniques of imagistic work, journal writ-
ing and art therapy create room for the patient to conjure up the kinds
of details that would make such a coherent story; the dream work and
the interpretation stages of the other techniques offer a similar oppor-
tunity for the patient to fill in gaps in the story with the appropriate
reading of dream symbols, images and words. 425
These therapeutic techniques also carry some danger of memory
hardening. In hypnosis, the danger is that a memory retrieved in a
trance will later take the Form of a hard and fast truth in the subject's
mind, making it impossible to cross-examine the subject or test his or
her integrity.424
 He or she believes the memory to be true, and so will
exhibit all the confidence and certainty of a person telling the truth,
even if the story is patently false. 425 In therapy, if the design is to access
a hidden memory and help the patient confront it, the patient's memo-
ries will be validated and encouraged at each step . 426 Because the goal
of therapy is to heal rather than to investigate, the therapist's primary
responsibility is to help the patient confront his or her experiences or
perceptions of those experiences.427 The therapist is therefore unlikely
to question the veracity of each image the patient retrieves, or to
inform the patient that his or her painstakingly recovered memories
may not represent the historical truth. 428 Furthermore, during this
process, many therapists encourage patients to avoid contact with fam-
ily members who do not acknowledge their memories because those
people are in denial and might try to dissuade the patient from the
conclusions he or she is reaching. 429 After undergoing a process that
421 SPENCE, supra note 61, at 95.
422 See id.
425 See Loftus, supra note 1, at 526-27.
424 See Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 133 (Alaska 1986); State v. Mack, 292 N,W.2d 764,
769 (Minn. 1980).
425 See Contreras, 718 P.2d at 133; Mark, 292 N.W.2d at 769.
424 See Loftus, supra note 1, at 530.
427
 See West v. Howard, 601 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Loftus, supra note 1, at
530.
4" See West, 601 N.E.2d at 533; Loftus, supra note 1, at 530.
429 See Frontline: Divided Memories (PBS television broadcast, Apr. I I, 1995) (discussing
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continually encourages and validates each glimpse of memory, in al-
most total isolation from people who might challenge or question
those memories, the patient can be expected to have an increased
confidence in the veracity of those memories even if they are not true.
Thus, the recovered memory witness, like the previously hypnotized
witness, may be difficult or impossible to cross-examine effectively.
Finally, expert testimony about the nature of recovered memory
may not be capable of informing a jury about how to evaluate the
recovered memory testimony.'" The professional community is so split
over this issue and so lacking in definitive scientific answers that juries
often are presented with conflicting hypotheses and no acceptable
means of distinguishing them. 431 This is the kind of problem that Frye
and similar cases were intended to protect against.432
 Where a jury's
ability to evaluate testimony depends on its understanding of the scien-
tific underpinnings of that testimony, it must be protected against
misplaced reliance on unproven or unsound scientific principles. 4"
If the Frye test is applied to recovered memory, recovered memory
should fail. Although a segment of the relevant professional commu-
nity certainly believes in the accuracy and validity of recovered memo-
ries, the controversy about this issue precludes a conclusion that it is
a generally accepted theory." 4
 The American Psychological Associa-
tion's panel has not yet come up with a conclusive answer, indicating
instead that both repressed memory and false memory are possible. 435
The research on each side of the debate merely indicates that each
phenomenon is possible, but does not disprove the other, 436
 With the
professional community still at this impasse, no general acceptance of
either theory exists sufficient to meet the standards of Frye.
Even under the revised test for admissibility of scientific evidence
in the Federal Rules of Evidence, as interpreted by the Supreme Court
treatment center that advocates "detachment" of its clients from families of origin as a necessary
component of therapy); see also Lorrus & Krrct-tAm, supra note 3, at 184-85 (telling the story
of a father accused by his adult daughter, who received a letter confronting him with the
recovered memory and informing him that, at the suggestion of her therapist, she was severing
all ties with him. She also stopped speaking to her older sister because her sister did not believe
in the memories and was considered harmful to the complaining daughter's treatment).
450 Barall, supra note 2, at 1486.
431 See id.
432 See Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 135 (Alaska 1986) (noting that the purpose of the
Frye rule was to ensure that juries would not be misled by "unproven, unsound scientific proce-
dures").
433 See id.; 13arall, supra note 2, at 1486.
454 See Schooler, supra note 102, at 452.
435 When Memories Collide, supra note 46, at B33.
436 See Id.
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in Daubert, testimony about a memory recovered through therapy
might likewise fail. 4" The theory of repressed memory, at least to the
extent that it involves the accuracy or reliability of recovered memories,
is not yet capable of being objectively tested.'m Although the theories
on both sides of the debate have been published and subjected to peer
review, the psychological community remains split over the issue. 439 The
error rate, or the extent to which recovered memories represent some-
thing that is wholly or partially false, is not known. 44" According to
memory researchers, however, that error rate may be significant."'
Finally, even under Daubert, widespread acceptance in a relevant scien-
tific community is a factor to consider in the admissibility of scientific
evidence. 442
 Because the psychological community remains so deeply
divided over this issue, the reliability of recovered memories cannot be
said to have gained widespread acceptance.' 43
Although the logic of applying Frye or Daubert to recovered mem-
ory testimony might be compelling, courts are unlikely to take such an
approach. Therapy does not involve the altered state of consciousness
that hypnosis does, and a patient may be more able to defend against
suggestion and inclinations to confabulate, Thus, although similar
dangers of suggestion, confabulation and memory hardening may exist
with memories recovered through therapy, the dangers may not be as
extreme, and the memories recovered might be closer to "normal"
memories than those recovered under hypnosis. The barring of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony is a rare exception to an otherwise liberal
presumption of competency."' If the dangers associated with memories
recovered through therapy are not as severe as those associated with
memories recovered through hypnosis and more closely approximate
the dangers associated with "normal" memory, they may not be suffi-
cient to justify such a complete exception to the rule.
Finally, adoption of a per se inadmissibility rule would effectively
undo recent, widespread changes in the law that allow victims of
childhood sexual abuse to bring suit. Because the events at issue in
4" See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786,2796-97 (1993) (describing
test for admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence).
438 See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796; see supra notes 217-26 and accompanying text for
discussion of difficulties with studying reliability of recovered memories,
433
 See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797; When Memories Collide, supra note 46, at B33.
44° See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797; When Memories Collide, supra note 46, at 833.
441 See Erttsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 155.
442
 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
443
 See id.; When Memories Collide, supra note 46, at. B33.
444 See State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571,575 (Idaho 1984); see also FED. R. Evil). 601 & advisory
committee's note.
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suits or prosecutions brought on the strength of recovered memories
are often decades old, little other evidence besides the recovered
memory testimony is likely to be available. Thus, prohibiting the testi-
mony in all circumstances would have the same effect as applying a
short statute of limitations. Over the past few years, twenty-three states
were sufficiently moved by the plight of adult survivors of childhood
sexual abuse who were barred from seeking legal redress to apply the
discovery rule to recovered memories."' At least with respect to these
jurisdictions, courts are unlikely to adopt a rule of evidence that would
recreate the precise problem the legislatures had sought to address.
C. Recovered Memory Testimony as Conditionally Admissible
The third approach would be to find that recovered memories are
potentially but not consistently reliable and should be subject to a
pretrial determination of reliability based on the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the recovery of the memory."' Some of the courts
that have adopted this approach to hypnotically refreshed testimony
have done so under the auspices of Frye, while others have rested their
conclusions simply on the question of reliability.`''' Thus, it is not
necessary to find that recovered memory therapy is a scientific tech-
nique subject to the Frye test in order to take this third approach."'
Authority for this kind of approach, assuming that the Frye rule is
not applicable to recovered memory therapy, lies in the power of
judges to bar evidence when its prejudicial effect substantially out-
weighs its probative value."' The probative value of recovered memory
testimony in general, and a given witness's testimony in particular, is
low because of the possibility of suggestion and confabulation, and
445 See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Stipp. 1363, 1370 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (applying Illinois
law and holding that the statute of limitations should be tolled for plaintiffs who repressed
memories of sexual abuse); Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638-39 (CL App. 1989)
(applying discovery rule to plaintiff who can show that memory of abuse was repressed).
446 See Iwakiri, 682 P.2d at 578 (holding that trial courts must hold a pretrial determination
of the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony, to be determined by the totality of the
circumstances rather than rigid adherence to procedural safeguards); State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86,
95, 96 (N.J. 1981) (holding that hypnotically refreshed memories may be admitted only if
procedural safeguards are followed to ensure reliability).
4-47 Compare Hurd, 432 A.2d at 91 (explicitly applying Frye to hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony) with Iwakiri, 682 P.2d at 575-76 (reaching its holding without explicit reference to Frye).
"8 See Iwakiri, 682 P.2d at 575-76, 578.
449 See Fan. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.").
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because of the uncertainty in the mental health profession about the
veracity of recovered memories. 450
 The prejudicial effect, on the other
hand, might be high. The mere accusation of sexual abuse is devastat-
ing, and could prejudice the jury against a defendant even before any
evidence is offered. In the case of recovered memory, cases are brought
years, even decades, after the alleged event occurred, frequently leav-
ing the recovered memory witness's testimony as the only "hard" evi-
dence available."' Finally, the sentiment expressed by clinical psycholo-
gists about their patients' memories may be common among jurors as
well: the idea that nobody would invent such a horrible story in the
absence of some truth.452
 Thus, without some case by case determina-
tion of the reliability of the witness's memory, the civil or criminal
defendant might be unfairly prejudiced.
Furthermore, reliance on an individual determination of reliabil-
ity would prevent the kinds of injustices that might occur with either
absolute admissibility or absolute inadmissibility. if a witness can estab-
lish that her testimony is reliable, she will not be blocked from seeking
legal redress from her abuser."' Such an approach also protects defen-
dants from claims that are likely to be unreliable. If a pretrial screening
process excludes the most dubious testimony, many innocent defen-
dants might be spared the expense and humiliation of defending
against a claim of sexual abuse in court. 454 Finally, exclusion of testi-
mony because of undue suggestions might encourage therapists to be
more circumspect in their treatment and diagnoses, reducing the num-
ber of patients who are misdiagnosed.
All of the particular safeguards used by the Hurd court and incor-
porated to some degree in the Iwakiri decision may not be appropriate
to the question of recovered memory, but the idea of a pretrial deter-
mination of reliability with some comparable guidelines could prove
useful. Many of the Hurd safeguards were created to address problems
associated with the use of forensic hypnosis. 455
 In forensic hypnosis, a
witness to a crime is hypnotized, often at the encouragement of the
45° SM Iwakiri, 682 13,2d at 575-76 (discussing the dangers of suggestion and confabulation
in hypnosis as reasons that it is too unreliable to be unconditionally admissible); SPENCE, supra
note 61, at 95 (discussing transference and how it can influence what a patient believes and
reveals to her therapist); Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 158 (discussing the dangers of
suggestion in therapy); Schooler, supra note 102, at 452 (discussing the polarization of the mental
health community over the reliability of recovered memories).
451 See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 167.
452 See LoFrus & KErctlam, supra note 3, at 209.
455 See supra notes 387-89 and accompanying text.
454 See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text..
455 See State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86,88-89,95 (N.J. 1981).
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police or prosecutor, in order to sharpen his or her memory of the
crime. Many of the safeguards address the particular problem of influ-
ence and suggestion by law enforcement or by a hypnotist who has
been apprised of the case and of what the police or prosecutor wants
to see the witness remember.4" Thus, those safeguards particular to
issues raised in the context of law enforcement are of limited utility in
the context of therapy.4" For example, the requirement that the hyp-
notist be independent from law enforcement or the defense and the
requirement that all information given to the hypnotist by the police
be recorded are not useful because they are specific to the dangers
associated with forensic hypnosis and law enforcement's involvement
in the process.
The other Hurd standards as well as additional factors used by
other jurisdictions that partially incorporate Hurd are useful.'" In
particular, the requirement that the person conducting the hypnosis
must be properly qualified, the requirement that all information re-
membered by the subject before hypnosis be recorded, the require-
ment that the session itself be recorded, and the consideration of both
the type of memory loss involved and the existence of corroborating
evidence all have some application to an evaluation of the reliability
of a particular recovered memory.'" Unlike the standards that directly
confront problems with the involvement of law enforcement in the
hypnotic process, these considerations shed light on the level of sug-
gestion involved in any memory enhancing procedure.
An examination of the therapist's qualifications is an important
factor in evaluating the reliability of a memory retrieved through
therapy. One of the criticisms launched at the recovered memory
movement is that many of the therapists involved are inadequately
trained and have a poor understanding of the workings of memory. 4"
The level of expertise of a particular therapist could influence the
degree to which the patient had been exposed to improper suggestion,
or informed of a possible diagnosis of sexual abuse that did not have
a real basis.961 In addition, the type of expertise that a therapist pos-
456 See supra note 318 and accompanying text for a list of the safeguards.
457 Bui see West v. Howard, 601 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (applying all of the
Hurd safeguards to the issue of therapeutic hypnosis and finding that the witness's testimony was
not reliable because the safeguards were not followed).
458 See supra notes 314-18 and accompanying text.
459 See id.; Zani v. State, 758 S.W.2d 233, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
460 See Reich, supra note 46, at 35.
461 See Kevin R. Byrd, The Narrative Reconstructions of Incest Survivors, 49 Am. PSYCHOL. 439,
439 (1994).
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sesses might also cast some light on the likelihood that the recovered
memory is either an independent memory or the product of sugges-
tion.'m If a therapist specializes in counseling victims of childhood
sexual abuse, the patients who see that therapist and understand the
nature of his or her practice might expect from the beginning to
recover memories of abuse.463
 Thus, the presence of a certain expertise
could itself cast doubt on the independence of the resulting memo-
ries.464
Similarly, consideration of what the patient remembered before
undergoing therapy and access to the contents of the therapy could
prove very useful in evaluating whether the memory had an inde-
pendent basis or was the product of suggestion. 466 With some documen-
tation of the patient's pretherapy memories, a court could more easily
determine whether the proposed testimony was consistent with those
memories. If the content of the therapeutic techniques were available
to the court, the presence or absence of improper suggestion could be
evaluated in real, rather than speculative terms. 466
 Even if a complete
transcript of the therapy were unavailable, information about which
techniques were used could help in determining reliability. For exam-
ple, group therapy is more suggestive than imagistic work, art therapy
or journal writing, and some techniques may not be significantly sug-
gestive at al1. 467
Understanding the type of memory loss involved also can have
some bearing on the credibility of the testimony:168
 For example, a
recovered memory of an event that occurred before the witness's
second year might be more dubious than one of a later event because
of the evidence that the human brain is not sufficiently developed to
462 See TERR, supra note 81, at 160-61.
463 Id.
464 See id.
466 See State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 578 (Idaho 1984); State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 96 (NJ.
1981).
466 See Loftus, supra note 1, at 529 (discussing the experience of an investigator hired to
record sessions with a therapist suspected of encouraging false memories in her patients), There
might be significant controversy in expecting therapists to record confidential sessions with their
patients. These are not being presented as requirements, however, as they are in Hurd, but as
factors for the court to consider. See Iwakiri, 682 P.2d at 578 (declining to adopt a rule that
required strict compliance with procedural safeguards and requiring instead an inquiry into
reliability under the totality of the circumstances). Thus, the absence of a recording might not
he fatal to the witness's testimony, but would remain an option for therapists who expect their
clients might end up in court, See id.
467 See supra notes 64-78, 157-70 and accompanying text for discussion of therapeutic
techniques.
468 See Hurd, 432 A.2d at 95-96'.
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store long term conscious memories until the age of three or four. 469
Finally, considering as a factor the existence or absence of evidence
corroborating the witness's testimony would be invaluable."° Evidence
of a person's behavior as a child consistent with sexual abuse, informa-
tion from other family members about events witnessed during that
period, or medical records from that period would go a long way to
distinguish a recovered memory that is probably true from one that is
possibly, or probably, false. 471
A case by case determination of reliability, based on the totality of
the circumstances rather than a rigid adherence to procedural safe-
guards, represents a balance of some of the policy concerns implicated
in either allowing all recovered memory testimony or allowing none.
A victim of childhood sexual abuse still would have access to legal
redress when the circumstances of his or her memory retrieval indicate
that it is an independent memory rather than the product of sugges-
tion. A defendant accused of sexual abuse, on the other hand, would
be protected from civil or criminal liability based on a memory that is
as likely to be false as it is to be true. Although this standard would
involve increased pretrial litigation and might be time consuming for
the courts, the concerns implicated on both sides of the debate are
important enough to warrant such an additional procedure.
In reaching this determination, a court should consider factors
including the qualifications and particular expertise of the therapist,
the existence of a record or any evidence of what, if anything, the
patient remembered before entering therapy, the existence of a record
of the therapy sessions or of what techniques were employed, the type
of memory loss involved, and the existence of evidence corroborating
the proposed testimony. The determination should be made under the
totality of the circumstances, rather than relying on a rigid adherence
to procedural safeguards like those used by the Hurd court. 472 Finally,
the task of the trial court would not be to evaluate the truth of the
proposed testimony, but rather to determine whether the testimony is
469 See 7R12, supra note 81, at 226; Wartick, supra note 102, at 62.
4" See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 38, at 166 (suggesting a requirement of corroborating
evidence in order to toll the statute of limitations in recovered memory cases).
471 See id. Some courts have required this as a precondition to the application of the delayed
discovery rule in repressed memory cases, reasoning that the credibility of a recovered memory
is an important factor in deciding whether to allow a decades-old case to come to court. See, e.g.,
Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Mich. App. 1988) (holding that corroborating
evidence was a prerequisite to tolling the statute of limitations in cases of recovered memory).
472 Compare Hurd, 432 A.2d at 91 with State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 575-76 (Idaho 1984).
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based on an independent memory or whether it is in any significant
way the product of suggestion. 473
V. CONCLUSION
The debate over recovered memory is often one of absolutes.
From one perspective, the crisis we are facing involves the victimization
of children and the need to remove the obstacles that might prevent
them from seeking legal redress from their abusers. From another,
the crisis involves potentially innocent adults being stigmatized, bank-
rupted, and sometimes criminally convicted on the basis of memories
that may be no more than suggestion and innuendo. From the first
perspective, if victims of sexual abuse are to have any real justice, their
stories must be believed. From the second, unless all claims of recov-
ered memory are met with a high degree of skepticism, the accused
will have no justice. It is important for the courts to recognize that
neither of the absolute positions has been generally accepted in the
psychological community, and that the truth likely lies in between. The
likelihood is that some recovered memories are true and some are
false, and there is no way as of yet to tell how many fall within each
camp. Thus, the only way for the courts to protect both the rights of
sexual abuse victims and the rights of those who may be wrongly
accused is to assume the role of gatekeeper by requiring a pretrial
determination of the reliability of any recovered memory sought to be
introduced at trial.
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473 See McGlauflin v. State, 857 1'.2d 366, 379 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
